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(a) Augustine the Man 
 
The protagonist, around whose opinions and philosophical outlook the attention of this thesis 
is centred, is today known as Saint Augustine of Hippo. A rough introductory synopsis of his 
life and a brief mention of that life’s impact in his times are necessary to understand the man 
behind the Latin texts to be treated and put in context in that same dissertation.  
  Aurelius Augustinus was born 13
th
 of November 354 C.E. into a nominally Christian 
household in the municipium of Thagaste. This town was located in Numidia Cirtensis, one of 
the provinces constituting the Diocese of Africa in the Praetorian Prefecture of Italy in the 
Late Roman Empire. After a standard elitist education in the liberal arts in which he proved to 
be a virtuoso, Augustine embarked on a fine career being first a grammar teacher 
(grammaticus) in his hometown in the years 373.C.E. and 374 C.E (Brown, 2000, p. 3), and 
subsequently he attained the much more esteemed position of a teacher in rhetoric in Carthage 
(Brown, 2000, p. 54), where he also became an adherent to the sect of Manichaeism
1
.  
 As the story has it in his autobiography Confessiones, Augustine was disappointed 
with the standard of discipline among the students at his school, and consequently moved to 
Rome in 383 C.E.
2
 and there established his own school of rhetoric. Demurring in his heart 
against Manichaeism which had proved to be an intellectual disappointment, Augustine 
became sympathetic to Scepticism of the New Academy (Eriksen, 2011, p. 69). Eventually 
                                                          
1 
Manichaeism was a gnostic dualistic religious sect, popular in Augustine’s Africa at the time. Sometimes 
labelled as a Christian heresy, sometimes considered an altogether separate religion, it nevertheless incorporated 
Jesus Christ into its purview as a supreme being of light or divine force.     
                         
Let us bless our Lord Jesus who sent to us the Spirit of Truth. He came; he separated us from the error 
of the world. He brought us a mirror. We looked; [we] saw this universe in it. ( Psalm 223: 2) 
 
This is a Manichean Bema psalm in Richard Valantasis’ Religions of Late Antiquity in Practice, translated by 
Jason David BeDuhn.  
  
2
 Jason BeDuhn provides a much more practical reason to Augustine’s move to Rome. It is a plausible 
suggestion. He points out that th e21
st
 of May in the year 383. C.B Gratian issued an edict which condemned 
Aigistine as a Manichean and hence his ‘escape’ to Rome. (BeDuhn, 2010, p. 141).  
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the vicissitudes of life, whether one label them as faith, providence or serendipity, landed him 
with a much coveted professorship of rhetoric at the imperial court in Milan, a city where 
Neo-Platonism, a revived and mystical form of Platonism, flourished.    
 This is not the place to delve deeply or even superficially into the doctrines and 
philosophical schools with which Augustine got acquainted before he became a Catholic 
Christian both formally and by a change of volition; but suffice it to remark that Neo-
Platonism had a great deal more in common in cosmology and teleology, ontology and ethics 
with Christianity than what Manichaeism or Scepticism had. Many Neo- Platonists believed 
in a Supreme Being more compatible to the omnipotent God of Christianity than that of the 
vulnerable Manichaean Deity (vide Osmun, 2010, p. 67-68). As it were, Neo-Platonism 
became a transitional step towards Augustine’s final religiosity.      
 Inspired by this newfound wisdom of Neo-Platonism Augustine went to Cassiciacum, 
30 km northeast of Milan, to live a contemplative life with likeminded friends and 
acquaintances, including his son Adeodatus. While immersing himself in Neo-Platonic books, 
he became a catechumen in the Catholic Church
3
. His baptism took place in Milan in 386 
C.E. and, having reoriented his will and lifestyle and obtained a genuine belief in the Catholic 
faith, he went homeward with the intention of continuing the lifestyle implemented at 
Cassiciacum. Augustine arrived back at Carthage late in 388 C.E. and sold his patrimony to 
fulfil this intention.         
 However, in 391 C.E. Augustine reluctantly became ordained as a priest (Brown, 
2000, p. 64) functioning under the catholic Bishop of Hippo Regius, a coastal city in the 
province of Africa not too far from Thagaste. He was invested with the bishopric of this city 
in 396 C.E. (though he was in appointed coadjutor bishop already the year before) and kept it 
until his death in 430 C.E. 28
th
 of August (Brown, 2000, p. 380).   
    
                                                          
3
 One ought also take into account the mundanely pragmatic reasons as to why he was prepared to take on the 
Catholic faith, but the conversion under the fig tree he famously relates in Confessiones, might possibly have 
taken place as well; or something like that, as long as it implied a resolve to  change a way of life. During his 
evolution of mental orientation and like his friend Nebridius, who did not easily settle for any final answers 
(Augustine Ep. 98.8), he never became permanently convinced to have found a solution that would satiate his 
never waning zeal for wisdom which began with the reading of Cicero’s exhortatory Hortensius. ( Augustine, 
Confessiones 3.3)          
 He was therefore never converted to them in the sense he finally became converted to Christianity; the 
underlying tone of Confessiones, for example, implies not a conversion from Neo Platonism to Christianity, but 
from his own vices which had led him to seek a final teleological answer elsewhere than under the authority of 
the Catholic Church. 
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(b) Augustine’s literary legacy 
Augustine’s life as bishop ran parallel to several settlements on heresies and converged with 
decisive historical moments for the society in which he lived and for those which came after 
him. Ecclesial posterity has benefited much from his polemics in theological controversies. 
Whether Augustine’s side has been taken outright, amended or rejected, important questions 
have been raised openly and sometimes imparted into the catechisms of the Catholic Church 
in which he was baptized. His most momentous controversies were raised against 
Manichaeism, Donatism and Pelagianism, the first of which presented an occasion for 
discussing and evangelising Christian morality, cosmology and ontology. The second 
controversy raised debate over the role of the Church and the functioning of the sacraments; 




 ideas of which the latters have 
partly become canon. He has furthermore written countless other works on various subjects, 
the greatest of which has captured my attention and is the Latin text responsible for and 
handled by this thesis.               
 Any topic extracted from Augustinian texts is vast one. An immense legacy of 
literature, which includes 270 letters, 150 exegeses of  biblical psalms, 40 other lesser works 
and the major works of De Civitate Dei, of De Doctrina Christiana and of De Trinitate, 
makes Augustine’s arsenal of Latin texts the largest one to date. Additionally there remain 
copies of between 400 and 500 of his sermons
6
. All these texts are imbued with moral 
teachings, some of course more than others, and some by association and some directly, and 
together they are written in a timespan of over 40 years. There are consequently many 
“Augustines” upon whose sentiments and perspective one can expound. His philosophical 
outlook did not remain constant even after his ordination, exactly because of the famous 
                                                          
4
 The Catholic Church denies predestinarianism: The essence of this heretical predestinarianism may be 
expressed in these two fundamental propositions which bear to each other the relation of cause and effect: (a) 
the absolute will of God as the sole cause of the salvation or damnation of the individual, without regard to 
his merits or demerits; (b) as to the elect, it denies the freedom of the will under the influence of 
efficacious grace while it puts the reprobate under the necessity of committing sin in consequence of the absence 
of grace (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12376b.htm). 
5
 The Catholic Church is as canon one form of traducianismism in lieu of creationism and generationism: 
‘Traducianism [is] in general the doctrine that, in the process of generation, the human spiritual soul is 
transmitted to the offspring by the parents. However ‘theologically, corporeal traducianism is heretical because it 







controversies mentioned above - and because of the effect deeper study and prolific writing 
can have on the outlook pertaining thereto. This aspect of Augustinian studies is important to 
bear in mind when using ancillary sources in order to explain Augustine’s thought in general 
on specific topics. Discrepancies, as they appear in the complete oeuvre of Augustine, can be 
subversive to the totality of a paradigm whenever too many crucial viewpoints have been 
substituted.     
(c) De Civitate Dei 
 
Augustine wrote De Civitate Dei contra Paganos, his magnum opus, in a time span of 14 odd 
years, from 412 C.E. to 426 C.E. It is a large synergetic work, even by modern standards. In 
substance it is an exhaustive defence of and elaboration on Christian philosophy, undertaken 
at the behest of a secretary of state and a close friend, who a few years later became a martyr 
and saint, Marcellinus of Carthage, to answer the charge that the Christians were responsible 
for the sack of Rome, perpetrated in 410 C.E. by the Goth Alaric. Ever dwindling, the 
traditional pagan elite at the time blamed Christianity for not having paid proper homage to 
these protective gods, and so accused their religious negligence and defiance as the real 
culprit of Rome’s misfortunes. Augustine fought back with acute logic, discrediting the vainly 
assumed beneficial cosmology of the gods. His arguments were acid, asserting that
 
none of 
the Romano-Greek gods was powerful enough to protect Rome. 
When can Segetia [ever] provide for the Empire, she who is not granted the 
responsibility for [both] corn and trees at the same time?
 7
 
Quando ergo Segetia urare imperium, cui curam gerere simul et segetibus et 
arboribus non licebat? (civ. Dei, IV: 8) 
Augustine drew examples from history to explain that Alaric’s was not the first invasion of 
Rome; and in this case the people was actually lucky enough to be invaded by a Christian 
who allowed churches to work as sanctuaries, filled up as they were with Christians and 
pagans alike (amplissimae basilicae implendae populo cui parceretur) (civ. Dei, I: 7). 
Augustine then began in book five to rebut pagan philosophy as almost equally futile, and in 
the eleventh book he started to reveal the beginning (XI-XIV) the progress (XV-XVIII) and 
end (XIX-XXII) of the of the City of God and the City of Men (retr. II: 43).   
                                                          
7
 I have chosen not to translate ergo which heralds the rhetorical question and the potentiality of an oxymoronic 
answer, and I have instead inserted two auxiliary words in square brackets to convey the point of Augustine. 
9 
 
 The delineation of the two comparative societies was possibly not intended for the 
original book; the prudent author alleged the main reason for continuing was 
lest someone should reproach me for only having argued against the [opinions and 
paradigm]
8
 of others and not having asserted my own. 
ne quisquam nos aliena tantum redarguisse, non autem nostra asseruisse reprehenderet. 
(ibidem) 
And given this resultant exposition on the two destinies of two kinds of wills (civ. Dei, 
XIV: 28) the work became thoroughly teleological and eschatological
9
. Teleology, which is 
never treated by him as a separately introduced subject, must be distilled from his associative 
thinking and is the lens through which many of his conceptualizations come into view. 
Augustine’s whole literal corpus is a constancy of intertexuality exactly because of the 
prevailing teleological undertone.         
 This tendency occurred to me in the incunabula of my acquaintance with Augustinian 
literature. At my second reading of De Civitate Dei, I soon became more attentive as to how 
pragmatically persuasive the rhetoric was in tone and how encyclopaedic it behaved, 
encapsulating much of the ancient world and literature which I had studied for some years; 
and this led me to be interested in a reader as a conceit and to be aware of his predisposition 
and plausible reaction to the sentiments presented in the 22 books. 
      
(d) The reader of De Civitate Dei 
 
One can with good reason imagine our reader to be a pagan aristocrat. That the pagans are the 
prime addressees, rather than the Manicheans or Neo-Platonists is suggested in the main title 
of the whole oeuvre, De Civitate Dei contra Paganos; and that the ideal reader of De Civitate 
Dei is supposed to be an aristocrat can be documented with the unambiguous address to the 
                                                          
8
 I assume opinions and paradigm under the inclusive Latin adjective aliena. 
 
9
 What could be labelled as Augustine’s teleology is less thematically restricted than how one would classify as 
his eschatology which only occupies itself with the consideration of the end, ἔσχατος, of times without, it seems, 
emphasizing the whys and wherefores. So the former’s delineable turf of is more encompassing, as it were, and 
more theoretical, when dealing in general with final causes and the ontological process and order which pertain 
thereto. Its moral and phenomenological descriptions are diachronic, although an explanation can make use of 
concrete examples. Eschatology reveals what actually will happen, regardless of theory. E.g: The very last 
chapter of De Civitate Dei is an eschatological exposition but possesses information vital for the teleological 
encouragement evoking the concomitant motivation to consider oneself in that eschatological outline. 
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traditional nobility, whereby Augustine exhorts them all, appealing to their 
ingenuity, to desire the decent way of teaching Christian theology in lieu of their paganistic 
traditions. 
Laudable talent of the Romans, o progeny of Regulus, of Scaevola, of Scipio and 
Fabricius! 
Indoles Romana laudabilis, o progenies Regulorum Scaeuolarum, Scipionum 
Fabriciorum (civ. Dei, II: 28)  
Moreover the autonomous reader of De Civitate Dei would have had to be erudite and 
master the Latin language in comparison to those listeners of Augustine’s sermons preached 
in the cathedral at Hippo. There was a popular trend contemporaneous with Saint Augustine, 
namely of illiteracy who bore no impediment to the obtainment of understanding divine will 
and of happiness. The erudite Augustine and his friend Alypius respected illiterate piety as 
can be read from the conversion in a garden of Milan in and his statement some weeks before: 
‘The uneducated are rising up and they capture heaven’ (Surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt) 
(conf. VIII: 8.19). Augustine clearly did not become one of those illiterate holy men, however 
fascination he might have had with them; and luckily so for the simple fact that the enormous 
production of De Civitate Dei, still available today, would not be possible but for his 
education. The literacy among the upper echelons of society also gave the opportunity for 
readers to be influenced by the understanding and consent of what he wrote, so that a further 
impact in the future Europe could ensue.  
 
(e) The Scope and Procedure of this Master’s Thesis 
 
I have allocated two themes in the thesis which will be treated in each of two parts, the first of 
which will consider the conditions for the intake of the teleological messages vis-à-vis the 
pagan aristocratic reader. Chapter two will introduce the meaning and implications of 
Augustine’s teleology of which an aspect will be further discussed in the following chapter on 
how this could affect the confrontation with the substance of the text itself on the part of the 
reader. Chapter three will seek to understand Augustine’s relation to the reader’s own world. I 
would thereby like to evince that the ancestors of the reader, in spite of not being the ultimate 
champions in the providential design of Augustine’s God, is subtextually given due 
recognition for the pagan aristocrat to savour and digest. In the same chapter the common 
11 
 
denominators of language and education and the pagan’s own effort of belief will be 
presented as extratextual influences on reader’s intake of the teleological sentiments in De 
Civitate Dei.
           
 
Finally the last chapter of part one of the thesis will take a look at Augustine’s 
confrontation and approximation to the reader’s paradigm as a sort of deliberately 
conspicuous reversion of what I would postulate is ultimately the goal of De Civitate Dei, 
namely to make the aristocratic or any other educated pagan reader approach and assent to the 
sentiments of the work in order to join the citizenship of the eponymous real City which De 
Civitate Dei promulgates as the ultimate bliss and most harmonious peace (civ. Dei, XIX: 13).  
 I hope to show that Augustine does not force the pagan aristocrat to start all over but 
rather reinvent the reader’s assumptions about divine reality adapting it to Judeo.-Christian 
cosmology. Chapter four will seek to understand Augustine's relation pagan concepts and the 
literature familiar to the pagan aristocratic reader. Therein, I examine how Augustine uses 
seemingly discordant epistemai, namely from pagan and Christian worlds, and unites them 
onto the canvas of his teleology. All in all, what the first part endeavours to illustrate is how 
the devotion of Augustine can have an effective appeal to the cultured and intellectual persona 
of a wavering pagan in the 5
th
 century’s Late Antiquity on these conditions.  
 The second part of the dissertation will be presenting and discussing the sentiments 
that constitute two messages: a preparative message and a final absolute communication 
which are both distillable from the text. Part two will start an exposition on the notion of 
using and enjoying as forms of experiencing and orienting one’s actions. Then I want to 
explicate the concomitances of power, whereby some specific allusive exhortations to 
contextualize one’s life with a higher divine purpose are put forth, so that consequently the 
possession of power can both be an asset and a burden as it implies teleological responsibility. 
If this is understood by the aristocratic reader and a false sense of powerfulness is effaced, 
then he might more easily be able to fulfil the rubrical exhortation which is under exposition 
in the next chapter.          
 That chapter will be introduced with the pinpointing of what specific type of peace 
Augustine is referring to as the final salvation for the reader and highlight Augustine’s caveat 
against vanity, id est behaviour and orientation which is a teleological cul-de-sac and which 
will threaten the attainment of peace and a future citizenship of City of God; and finally the 
notion of truth will be explicated as the antidote to vanity and the aiding principle to 
happiness.           
 The conclusion will attempt to answer satisfactorily on how the teleological and 
12 
 
existential sentiments in chapter five and six constitute valid ethical information with salvific 
consequences for the reader, as is evident from the subtext of De Civitate Dei itself. Lastly it 
sums up how the phraseology of the teleological sentiments, in regard to the extra- and 
intertextual conditions which have been exposed in part one, establish a real potentiality of 
appeal for the pagan aristocrat.   
(f) Some literary Decisions 
 
I want to show in the thesis that philology is an adroit way of distilling a sentiment from 
subtextual meanings. All translations of the original Latin texts will be my own renditions. 
This is not because there is anything grammatically or rhetorically unsatisfactory with the 
already translated editions of Augustine’s works. Commutation of the syntax or perchance the 
replacement of a word with a synonym is committed for one of three purposes: of either 
simplification, of exactness or most importantly in order to contrive a slightly different 
response to the words used in English which might be relevant to the discussion at hand, 
without in any way being unfaithful to the authors’ intended meaning. It has been impossible 
(and it would indeed be pointless) not to be affected by the translated version, read for the 
intake of substance, but I have then translated it anew and verbatim as a prelude to the final 
rendition, so that other preferable translative choices would become apparent.   
 In reference to a nonspecific person, who must be denominated by a gender by the 
third person singular pronoun, I have followed the trend of the day to use the same gender as 
that to which I myself, the writer, belong, namely the masculine.     
 The tenses sustained in the thesis are, apart from the introduction and some conscious 
exceptions, in either the present or present perfect to make Augustine more alive and 











Extra- and intertextual conditions for the teleological 
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The Importance and Implications of Telos 
 
THREE PREFATORY ELUCIDATIONS 
For prefatory elucidation, three mandatory questions should be asked before further 
investigation: 
 
(a) What in general is teleology and what does it have to do with the pagan aristocratic reader of 
De Civitate Dei? 
 
Teleology is the field of study of final causes, whether it is behind the ken of religious 
existentialism, or whether it is of simple syllogistic philosophical reasoning. Final causes 
diverge from the other Aristotelian causes of efficiency, materiality and form, whose 
functions Andrew Woodfield has illustrated with this straightforward example. 
In answer to the question ‘Why did this building come to be as it is?’ We can say 
‘Because of the bricks and mortar’ (material cause); ‘Because it is a house’ (formal 
cause);’Because the builder made it’ (efficient cause); or ‘Because it is for living in’ 
(final cause). (Woodfield, 1976, p. 4) 
Alongside the same rationale, taking the “building” to denote the human being, the 
existentialist and incumbent reader of De Civitate Dei may have considered himself as being 
and asked the simple question ‘Why are we like we are?’ to which a tentative answer, 
prosopetic  of Augustine, could be: Because we are “body and soul” (material cause) (b. vita,  
II: 7); because we are humans (formal cause); because we were made thus by God (efficient 
cause). As for the final cause a much longer answer is needed to the question asked above, for 
it is beyond my intellect or erudition of Augustinian studies to condense the answer into one 
sentence. The aristocrat who has begun De Civitate Dei is not going to receive a summary 
response either,  but he is still likely to seek out an explanation of cosmos which incorporates 
the final cause of his own creation; the likelihood is an agreement with Brian Stock’s 
notification that ‘the moral of the story [of Augustine’sconversion] is that a “true religion” 
cannot be located by an individual unless he first believes in its goals, which supported by 
15 
 
influence of tradition, he will later understand’  (Stock, 1998, p. 176).   
 Therefore Augustine’s own philosophical journey and final approbation of Christianity 
yields a fine and salient example on how the search for a consistent teleology is preeminent in 
deciding a worldview. The incunabula of every newcomer’s or still prospective convert’s 
embrace of Augustine’s ethical perspective, which is sustained by the wholeness of his 
religion, is most efficaciously proceding by the grasp of this religion’s teleology. A 
conversion (conversio) is a turning, a versio, aligning the convert with (con-) a new goal, in 
this case God. Teleology is consequently what defines the convert’s new religious orientation 
and what can sustain it by comprehension. 
 
(b) Telos as end or fulfilment? 
 
What, then, is Augustine’s teleology as it is evinced in De Ciuitate Dei? First I must confess 
this: I have yet to come across a sentence in which Augustine mentions the Greek term τέλος. 
Hence Augustine’s teleological messages must be distilled from context, from his associative 
thinking, and then the vision of telos can be constructed and adduced from individual 
sentiments which form a consistency of that particular philosophical discourse and outlook. 
Therefore I would like to consider the implications of the literal absence of telos and what 
ontic destination the reader can anticipate from the substitutes of the Greek term.  
 Telos generally translates into English as fulfilment or completion and is the equivalent 
of the Latin effectus. Other translations of telos are issue, result, and end.  The verb τέλλω 
means to make to arise, to accomplish and in a passive sense: to come forth, to arise
10
.  
 In a more august existential purview for any entity, existence leads up to an intentional 
telos as a consummation, the fulfilling purpose of its being; and here effectus can seem too 
commonplace and mundane. Where the endpoint is emphasized rather than any random result 
finis is more apposite, and the English word finished is precisely derived from finīre (through 
old French) and its derivatives finis and finale, frequently appear throughout De Civitate Dei. 
A cause is describing something which already is, albeit abstractly.  Telos is, when distilled as 
a solid concept, something that will be in the future. A human who has reached its final telos 
has no anticipated telos but simply exists as its supposed outcome. Its former ontic 
imperfection has passed and is finished.      
                                                          
10
 It can also be applied as a cessation in the expressions to βίου, the end of life, and be associated with gloomy 
prospects as in τέλος θᾰνάτου the point or term of death (lat. exitus mortis) (Liddell; Scott, 1978, p.799). 
16 
 
 However, since language is not a nomenclature (Dardano; Trifone, 2008, p. 7), it is 
erroneous, precarious at best, to equipoise the versatile significances of telos with finis which 
has a more restricted repertoire of meanings. To explain, telos as ‘end’, as in the ‘endpoint’ 
which is connoted by the Latin finis, can be downright misleading, since there is for 
Augustine little resemblance of finality and termination when it comes to a soul’s existence 
once telos has been reached. And to make things more complex, finis not only carries 
connotations which diverge noticeably from the Greek word telos but also purport different 
insinuations by the denotation of end alone, depending on the objective or subjective to which 
it relates in the subtext. At some point in De Civitate Dei even Augustine himself feels the 
need to clarify the vitally different consequences and circumstances which can be associated 
by an endpoint – a need ushered by the much less frequent use of effectus which by its explicit 
meaning of result, could have erased some semantic misunderstandings at crucial points in the 
text. Exempli gratia, Augustine attaches to finis of bonum (good) and malum (evil) divergent 
repercussions, though the essential notion of completion is the same. 
Ergo the end of good signifies here, not that it is finished, so that it no longer exists, 
but that it is completed; and the end of evil is not where it ceases to be, but where its 




Finem boni ergo nunc dicimus, non quo consumatur, ut non sit, sed quo perficiatur, ut 
plenum sit; et finem mali, non quo esse desinat, sed quo usque nocendo perducat. 
Fines itaque isti sunt summum bonum et summum malum. (civ. Dei, XIX: 1) 
Moreover, since one can see in the paragraph that summum boni and summum mali have the 
meanings of result, one can subsequently ask whether Augustine means telos as the ideal end, 
whereto the nature of a human soul is in all propriety intended, or as the actual result, 
however lamentable.             
 In De Civitate Dei it is adumbrated that telos does not so much represent an absolute 
end, but a discontinuation of ontic growth. As hell is the nadir of existence
12
, the notion of 
                                                          
11
 The denial that a language is a nomenclature induces the translator’s selection to the substituting word, 
proffering to the reader an intact meaning throughout the translative process. Consūmere and perfīcere both 
means to finish, but Casell’s Latin dictionary adds to use up, consume to the translation of consūmere and to 
accomplish, achieve to the translation of perfīcere (Simpson, 1977, p. 436). Also, the derivative nouns consumtio 
and perfectio, respectively meaning a consuming or destroying and a completion or perfection, make the 
difference clearer.   
12
 Properly speaking evil does have a telos, in the sense of a result. The soul does not cease to exist because 
otherwise it could not be punished, but ‘it can rightly be called dead for it does not live from God [anymore]’ 
(recte mors animae dicitur, quia non uiuit ex Deo) (civ. Dei, XIII: 2).  
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heaven epitomizes the zenith of existence.  There in heaven each and every one becomes who 
they were supposed to be, the fullness of their being.  Hell on the other hand is simply a place, 
or rather a perpetual state of mind which forbids teleological fulfilment. Although 
Augustine’s teleology resonates with a stronger tone of finality and conclusiveness, with its 
linear notion of history and time (civ. Dei, XII: 14) compared to the metempsychosis of 
Platonism and the recycling of the world of Heraclitus
13
, this finality is not tantamount to a 
total discontinuation of versatility and activity. There will be both movements and motionless 
states in heaven (motūs et statūs) and this indicates temporality. Still, there will be a final end 
of longing (finis desideriorum) and ‘this gift of experience and [loving] action will indeed be 
common to all as eternal life will be shared’
14
. Hence the reader is not met with a conclusive 
escape from everything temporal, but this laudable future condition is hardly disappointing. 
Whether one calls it finis or telos, for the good the final destination will entail happiness. 
 
(c) A telos in activity? 
 
To distill cohesive teleological messages in De Civitate Dei as a mean, as a set of instructive 
principles by which one can achieve and adhere to that ontological self-actualization which is 
the peace of the City of God, one must ask what telos is in essence for Augustine, the Bishop 
of Hippo who is the author of the work. When one declares telos with Augustine’s 
convictions, one is talking of none other than the Christian Trinitarian God, the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit in a Trinity. I think it pertinent to render a thorough delineation of the 
divine hypostasis in which Augustine believed; and, since this description is solely for 
illumination in the thesis, I have translated a more catechetic articulation of Augustine’s from 
De Trinitate, which corresponds to what he labels as the universal or catholic belief (catholica 
fides). 
The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit penetrate one divine unity of one substance 
in inseparable equality. They are not three gods but One God, albeit the Father has 
begotten the Son, and for that reason the Son is not who the Father is; and the Son is 
begotten by the Father and thus the Father is not who the Son is; and the Holy Spirit is 
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 Marcus Dods writes in a note in his translated The City of God that ‘Heraclitus supposed that “God amused 
himself” by renewing the worlds’ (Dods, trans. 2010, p. 352). 
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 Qui motus illic talium corporum sint futuri, temere definire non audeo, quod excogitare non ualeo; tamen et 
motus et status, sicut ipsa species, decens… erit finis erit desideriorum nostrorum Hoc munus, hic affectus, hic 




neither the Son nor the Father but only the Spirit of the Father and the Son, being 
Himself co-equal with the Father and the Son and belong to the Unity of the trinity.. 
This is my faith, as it is the Catholic faith.  
Pater et filius et spiritus sanctus unius substantiae inseparabili aequalitate diuinam 
insinuent unitatem non sint tres dii sed unus Deus quamvis Pater Filium genuerit, et 
ideo Filius non sit qui Pater est; Filiusque a Patresit genitus, et ideo Pater non sit qui 
Filius est; Spiritusque Sanctus nec Pater sit nec Filius, sed tantum Patris et Filii 
Spiritus, Patri et Filio etiam ipse coaequalis et ad Trinitatis pertinens unitatem… 
Haec et mea fides est, quando haec est catholica fides. (Trin. I: 4.7) 
Augustine claims Christians to be the only ones who understand God in this 
hypostasis. As for other characteristics of God, Augustine quotes Cicero conveying the 
limitlessness and independence of an ultimate consciousness. 
Cicero … certainly wanted to define God within his capacity when stating: “ There is 
a certain mind, unbound and free, secret from all mortal concretization, which knows  
and moves everything and is itself provided with an eternal motion.”
15
 
Deum certe uolens, sicut poterat, definire Cicero…: “Mens quaedam est, inquit, 
soluta et libera, secreta ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et mouens 
ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno.” (civ. Dei, XXII: 20) 
Plato is admitted to have imputed a tripartite causation to God whose properties bears some 
resemblance to the peculiarities of the three individual persons in the Trinity.  
For him, [Plato] God is showed to be the author of all natures, bestower of intelligence 
and the implanter of the love by which one lives in happiness.  
Cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus uisus est neque intellegentiae dator 
neque amoris, quo bene beateque uiuitur, inspirator. (civ. Dei, XI: 25) 
This Platonic theodicy corresponds to the Christian, insofar God is an efficient cause; but it 
does not tell anything about God as telos (final cause)
16
. God which the pagan aristocrat will 
encounter in De Civitate Dei ison the other hand an involved God, helping both the author 
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 The theodicy is taken from Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I: 27.66. 
 
16
 Furthermore, Neo- Platonism disclaims the factor of love being the supreme ontic component of the realization 
of one’s telos. Bruno Switalski accords the Neo-Platonists the consideration of eudaemonistic ecstasy ‘not an act 
of love but exclusively an act of the intellect, which is moreover unconscious of itself’ (Switalski, 1946, p. 108). 
In Neo-Platonism the Supreme Being’s own disposition is less active than the Christian God who as telos is 
playing a part in humanity’s fulfilment and that of secularity. Still, the very comparison shows some sign of 
affinity with Plato and a reluctance to jettison his former paradigm as incomparable. 
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Augustine’s Affinity with the City of Men and with its pagan 
aristocratic Inhabitant 
 
AFFINITY WITH THE LATE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
(a) The Empire and Its People  
 
The facticity of the world is not ignored by Augustine; he is far from those coenobitic monks 
who relinquish every substantial involvement in mundane affairs, and this might instigate and 
sustain credibility in the judgment of an aristocrat of the Late Roman Empire who has several 
duties inextricably linked to a set structure of socital institutions (Salzmann, 2009, p. 49-53). 
Augustine, as he is also much involved with his near and far community, uses the institutions 
of the imperial state and recommends every Christian to do likewise, (plausibly to the 
aristocratic reader’s relief). 
The entirety of human institutions, which are a convenience to the necessary practices 
of life, must not be spurned by Christians; no indeed, the institutions should be paid 
sufficient attention to and be retained in memory. 
17
   
Haec tota pars humanorum institutorum, quae ad usum vitae necessarium proficiunt, 
nequaquam est fugienda Christiano, immo etiam quantum satis est intuenda 
memoriaque retinenda. (doc. Chr. II: 25.40) 
The pagan aristocratic reader and Augustine are part of the same Empire, whose history they 
both share in memory in addition to the shared academic and literal heritage which I will 
discuss below. Stephen J. Duffy elaborates on Augustine’s perception on memoria under the 
topic of Augustinian anthropology. 
The human person is a diachronic being. Not only does a human have a past, but to a 
large extent one is one’s own past as well as one’s present and future
18
, hence 
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Augustine’s identification with memoria with selfhood’. (Duffy,” Anthropology”, 
Augustine through the Ages, 2009, p. 25)  
Memory, according to Augustine, is what binds culture and society together; and this 
allegation makes a lot of sense. If there is not any memory in a community of itself it could 
not persist in being so, since this memory is the basic common mind-set which allows and 
inspires people to work together for a common goal. Memory is what binds an individual to 
the society in which it lives; it conditions his ontological standpoint in a relative manner; and 
accordingly the City of God is emphasized as the nation of God.     
 A difference between state and nation should be elucidated: I can easily move to 
another state and feel the state apparatus penetrating my daily life; I can formally become a 
citizen, and thus be legally part of that state, without becoming so in spirit if my memory is 
incongruent in certain quintessential aspects with that of rest of the population. Memory 
(memoria) is a faculty of the mind, whose proper functioning of a majority of individuals is a 
prerequisite for a nation to last for some space of time as an organization of consensus. In this 
line of thought any harmonious body of individuals, which remains so, can be a nation. 
A community is not made happy by one thing and an individual made happy by 
another, because a community is nothing else than a harmony of many individuals.  
Neque enim aliunde beata ciuitas, aliunde homo, cum aliud ciuitas non sit quam 
concors hominum multitude. (civ. Dei, I: 15) 
So in Augustine’s purview being part of a nation is an experience of harmony which lays the 
foundation for future good experiences, id est prospective memories.    
 An aim for perfection is theoretically attainable when everyone has the same divinely 
inspired goals (telos) of politics in view and the corresponding means to achieve them. A 
discrepancy, however, is evident in that laws, being the normal means to monitor a society 
towards an agreed state of affairs, are simultaneously in their necessitation a symptom of an 
extant disagreement on what this state of affairs should be. Therefore Augustine exhorts to 
obedience, because realistically the topicality of the mortal world impinges upon the heavenly 
society. The City of God on its earthly sojourn is depended on facets of the mundane society 
which bear resemblance to something divinely orientated, namely its laws for perseverance of 
order.  
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 What I think, Duffy indicates by ‘being one’s future’ is the anticipation thereof which is ‘integrated into one’s 
present experience’ (vide ibidem). 
22 
 
The Heavenly City, or rather the part thereof which in this mortal state travels as a 
foreigner and lives by faith, has to makes use of the peace [of the Empire]
19
, until it 
transcends to the immortal state for which such a peace is necessary. Therefore, the 
Heavenly City, while it lives like a captive along with the Earthly City, does not 
hesitate to obey the laws thereof; for that which makes the mortal life sustainable, is 
administered by these laws in order that concordance be maintained in those things 
which appertain to both cities; because [at this point] mortality is shared, even though 
the Heavenly City has been given a promise of redemption with the gift of the Holy 
Spirit as a warranty.    
Ciuitas autem caelestis uel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et 
uiuit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa, cui talis pax necessaria 
est, mortalitas transeat; ac per hoc, dum apud terrenam ciuitatem uelut captiuam 
uitam suae peregrinationis agit, iam promissione redemptionis et dono spiritali 
tamquam pignore accepto legibus terrenae ciuitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae 
sustentandae mortali uitae adcommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat, ut, quoniam 
communis est ipsa mortalitas, seruetur in rebus ad eam pertinentibus inter ciuitatem 
utramque concordia. (civ. Dei, XIX: 17) 
The obedience of the ‘legibus terrenae civitatis’ is therefore necessitated inasmuch as these 
laws are the divine laws’ feeble substitutes. The snag is that this is simply not always the case. 
Augustine has repeatedly and famously been quoted, that ‘an unjust law is no law at all’, 
which is originally artuclated as: ‘It does not seem to me to be a law, that which has not been 
just’ (mihi lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit) (lib. arb, I: 5). And this ipse dixit 
adumbrates an equally strong necessity, namely that the earthly laws by definition must bear 
their likeness from the divine ones subsumed under ‘the most just ordinance of the Creator’ 
(iustissima ordinatio creatoris) (civ, Dei, I: 20), id est divine law.   
 
(b) The Edifice of Empire in teleological and providential Context 
 
The relative easiness of communication in the Roman Empire has given opportunity for 
Christianity to spread, and under the same headline Augustine infers that the Church itself is 
made possible by the Empire which consists of a common memory which steers a collective 
attitude towards the obtainment of heaven which is phrased by Augustine as the City of God, 
a city which will not only make the universal Church possible but see to its fulfilment. 
 Edward Morgan observes that ‘Augustine's reflections in the De Civitate 
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Dei demonstrate how the ecclesia is able to bring together in an ordered unity people who 
were previously divided from one another by their differing languages.’ What Morgan means 
by ecclesia is the congregations of the Christian community, but there has been another 
congregation, that of the government of the Roman Empire, which also greatly has facilitated 
this ‘ordered unity’. Augustine, and explicitly so, promotes the exertion made by the secular 
state to remedy the issue of incommunicability between nations, which would have stood as 
an unfortunate impediment to evangelization. 
But there have been efforts by the imperial state that not only its yoke but that also its 
own language is to be imposed on the subjugated people for the sake of
20
 the peace of 
the community.
21
   
At enim opera data est, ut imperiosa civitas non solum iugum, verum etiam linguam 
suam domitis gentibus per pacem societatis imponeret. (civ. Dei, XIX: 7) 
Admittedly Augustine laments the methods practiced to achieve this. In short, miseries has 
provided some joy, but still more miseries are in the advent (non est tamen eorumdem 
malorum finita miseria) (ibidem). A common language has been achieved but in derogation of 
natural freedom for many, and of real justice.      
 Still, Augustine’s conception on divine providence seems to contextualize these 
regrettable evils as a necessary corollary of the permitted sinfulness of mankind.    
Consequently, since an empire in praxis has been realized by the ambitions of certain 
individuals, and furthermore, since God is alleged by Augustine to be pleased with the 
realization of an Empire in the west (…cum diu fuissent regna Orientis inlustria, uoluit Deus 
et Occidentale fieri) (civ. Dei, V: 13), it seems that ambition is a component in God’s 
providence. Augustine alleges:  
God made concessions of great power to such people who, for the sake of integrity, 
praise and glory, saw to the interest of their fatherland, in order to overcome the 
grievous ills of many nations. They did not hesitate to prioritize their county’s safety 
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 Augustine hence predicates what is going to become a real asset in the future. Verily Latin became a 




for their own, suppressing lust for money and many other vices for the sake of this one 
vice, id est vainglory. 22 
….idque talibus potissimum concessit hominibus ad domanda grauia mala multarum 
gentium, qui causa honoris laudis et gloriae consuleuerunt patriae, in qua ipsam 
gloriam requirebant, salutemque eius saluti suae praeponere non dubitauerunt, pro 
isto uno uitio, id est amore laudis, pecuniae cupiditatem et multa alia uitia 
comprimentes. (ibidem) 
The ethicist goes on: 
They despised their own affairs for the common cause, id est the state and the state 
treasury. They resisted avarice, aided their country with counsel for freedom, neither 
addicted to that which according to their laws was considered a crime, nor addicted to 
lust.  
Sic et isti priuatas res suas pro re communi, hoc est re publica, et pro eius aerario 
contempserunt, auaritiae restiterunt, consuluerunt patriae consilio libero, neque 
delicto secundum suas leges neque libidini obnoxii. (civ. Dei, V: 15) 
This might resonate well with a pagan aristocratic reader, who is a possible descendent of 
these deceased men now receiving laudable attributes from his converter.   
 Moreover, Augustine appears to agree, as to the definition of a people, with Scipio 
who is the famous general who conquered the Carthaginian enemies of Rome in 202 B.C.E.  
A people is defined [by Scipio] as an assemblage of the multitude joined by an 
agreement on law and common share of service.  
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 Since amore laudis is tantamount to vanity (vanitas) when it is not redirected or transferred to God, the 
expression can here be seen to be connoted as vainglory. It is important to remember comprimentes as 
suppressing something; and accordingly vainglory does not obliterate latent vices; yet it conveniently keeps them 
in check for providential design’s sake (civ. Dei, V: 15), for the Roman Empire has grown to be a more 
illustrious (imperii latitudine et magnitudine inlustrius)
 
(civ. Dei, V: 13) than the Persian, Augustine argues, 
because of the desire of praise by its politicians.        
 Augustine has indeed been, possibly due to formulations connected to this topic, ‘criticized for his 
narrow and utilitarian, extremely reductivist viewpoint’ (Harrison, 2004, p. 60). Augustine’s providential 
outlook heralds that the ends actually do give sense and rationale to the means, but whereas in virtue ethics the 
definitions of the virtues to be upheld are quite fixed, utilitarian ethics are more prone to be opinionated as to 
what would induce good ethical result. A statement from De Mendacio further indicates this line of thought, 
especially since Augustine has been stated to be at his least pragmatic concerning lying in general. (v. Dodaro, 
2004, p. 118): ‘It must be considered whether there is admittance for compensation for the sake of avoiding a 





Populum enim esse definiuit coetum multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis 
communione sociatum. (civ. Dei, XIX: 21)
23
 
In light of this definition Populus Dei and Civitas Dei are synonyms for Augustine. Hence, 
Populus Dei could suffice as the denomination of his greatest literary work; and consequently 
the very fact that Augustine employs the word and model of civitas, both to signify a 
heavenly communion and to portray the earthly Christian fellowship, makes the point that the 
edifice of a state announces a good thing. Because of stately instituted peace, the diaspora 
Jews in the Roman Empire have now the opportunity to divulge the prophets and the 
Commandments so that no one will suspect the Christians, including Augustine himself, of 
having made up (confictum a nobis) the historical and cosmological paradigm surrounding 
Christianity’s evangelical message. The situation of the Empire is thereby ordained by 
providence (Dei providentia est) (civ. Dei, IV: 34)24.      
 Augustine assumes the Empire, around whose edifice the Church has grown, as a 
significant part of Judeo Christian historicity, since by his own definition of a people the 
Church is the closest thing to a universal nation, for  
a nation is an assemblage of people united by the same consensus(communione 
sociatus) and common rationale (multitudinis rationalis)of what is to be loved.
25
  
Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione 
sociatus. (civ. Dei, XIX: 24) 
 The church as a ‘corpus permixtum’ (en. Ps, LXI: 6) combines the actuality of the Earthly 
City with the altruism of the Heavenly. As it always will have some imperfections, this 
corpus permixtum is not to be completely relied upon to perfectly imitate the Heavenly city. It 
is ‘thoroughly mingled’ (permixtum) with bad and good humans alike; as when a fisher 
looking solely for cod will have gotten many maritime lifeforms in his net, the net of the 
church likewise contains all kinds of people ‘until the net reaches the shore’ (donec 
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 Dei prouidentia est, ut…de codicibus eorum probetur, quem ad modum hoc fuerit tanto ante prophetatum; ne 
forte, cum legeretur in nostris, a nobis putaretur esse confictum. (civ. Dei, XIX: 23)  
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perveniatur ad litus) (civ. Dei, XVIII: 49)
26
. The essential thing is that the catch is prodigious, 
and this is partly the merit of the ancestors of the aristocratic pagan reader. 
 
THE PAGAN ARISTOCRATIC READER: A COMMON LANGAUGE, A 
DIFFERENT BELIEF 
(a) Language as common Denominator 
 
The demarcation of paganism is somewhat blurred, and I will not try here to be innovative but 
instead quote Gerald Bonner’s clear-cut designation of paganism as ‘a set of beliefs and 
conventions, rather broadly based on certain religious assumptions, generally accepted, and 
rejected only at the prize of becoming an outsider’ (Bonner, 1984, p. 343).  The situation for 
being labelled as an outsider is almost reversed by the time Augustine begins his labour on De 
Civitate Dei, where he hurls out polemics and ridicule against traditional paganism without 
fear of persecution.           
 For the pagan reader’s traditional culture things look bleak. Emperor Theodosius made 
Christianity a state religion in 392 C.E. and pagan practices are therewith outlawed. Still ‘in 
dealing with those aristocrats  whose pagan linkage remains strong the late Roman emperor 
cannot go beyond a certain range of actions’ (Salzman, 2002, p. 190), and consequently 
paganism is not quite extinct. Luckily Augustine is very prequalified to the task of converting 
by the same reason the pagan reader is inadvertently prequalified to be converted.  
 There is an aphorism, whose verity I think would be considerably recognized by 
Augustine, that of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the late German philosopher who is posthumously 
an eminent authority on hermeneutics:  
Language is the medium in which substantive understanding and agreement happens 
between two people. (Gadamer, 2012, p. 386) 
The fact that Augustine is conscious of this, as all educated people in the Roman society are, 
can be assumed from the annoyance he has had as a young student over his failure to master 
Greek as a second language
27
, and from his promptness to stress out the reconciliatory effect a 
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an author which is communicated pedagogically to the reader. 
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 Even though recent research has proved that he in due course masters that language enough to read the Greek 
version of the Bible and some philosophical texts written in the Greek original (Switalski, 1946, p.79, footnote 
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common language might produce as the main medium of human intercommunication. 
Augustine proposes a hypothetical encounter between two humans of different tongues and 
places their ability to communicate below that of animals, indeed even below that of animals 
of different species (facilius sibi muta animalia, etiam diuersi generis) (civ. Dei, XIX: 7). The 
accuracy of this allegation can be rejected; even so he raises an important issue therewith. 
Lack of smooth communication is an impediment for everyone involved, and language as 
medium and method is extolled as something essential to this earthly life which is 
propaedeutic to the true communication of heaven, ergo an aspect of the fulfilment (telos) of a 
human being.           
 Gadamer further claims:  
One relates the demands of fashion to a whole that one’s own taste keeps in view and 
accepts only what harmonizes with this whole and fits together as it does. (Gadamer, 
2012, p. 33)  
One’s own taste and fashion stipulates the intake of new ideas. Even inspiratory the ratio 
between that of content and of rhetorical execution can in this respect be in the latter’s favour. 
Augustine knows this all too well; as a young adult he had given up on The Bible, which he 
would later come to regard as the most important, indeed the only necessary literature for 
salvation; and the abandonment of the Sacred Sciptures was mostly due to their uncouth style 
(vilitas dictorum) which did not harmonize with his expectations, a fact against which he 
warns others (conf. XII: 27.37). He found the experience as a reader distasteful, as it were, 
and could not at that point in his life incorporate the sentiments therein into his hermeneutics.  
 Gadamer also argues that ‘if every language is a view of the world, it is not so 
primarily because it is a particular type of language (in the way that linguists view language) 
but because of what is said or handed down in this language’ (Gadamer, 2012, p. 438). 
Conveniently, when significant parts of the cultural erudition of Augustine and the pagan 
reader are common, this facilitates the repudiation of the paganism of the latter. Augustine has 
read Varro, Cicero, Seneca (Beduhn, 2010, p. 96) and Vergil (Eriksen, 2000, p. 42), and if the 
pagan educated reader has done the same it insures a correlation by the unity of language as a 
support for communication in De Civitate Dei.       
 For example: There is a claim on the part of Augustine which describes the 
circumstances of Christian preaching:  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nr. 384), it is evident from Confessiones that Augustine himself hated Greek as a subject at school (conf. I: 
13.20).   
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Nothing unsightly and shameful is proposed [for the auditors of Christian 
evangelization] to either watch or imitate.  
 
Nihil enim eis turpe ac flagitiosum spectandum imitandumque proponitur. (civ. Dei, II: 
28) 
If that statement is to be communicated as intended, the qualifications of turpe and 
flagitiosum must be somewhat common to both the pagan readers (eis) and to the general 
ethical outlook of Augustine; and so its communicability is stipulated by the usage of the 
two terms in a common literal heritage; id est turpitude and shamefulness would have to 
have been promulgated somewhere beforehand to be shunned, independent 
on whether one is affected by the moral sentiment sympathetically, if only 
intelligibly. There are many examples thereof, but the most apt at the present discussion 
is from De Finibus, the main teleological treatise of Cicero, where both turpiter and 
flagitiose are convened in a moralistic castigation. 
Who among us would say, we who are not ashamed to call those thing evil which 
are by the Stoics called hardships, that it is better to perpetrate something base 
entailing pleasure than to do something honest entailing pain? It seems to us that 
Dionysus of Heraclea did a shameful deed when he dissented from the Stoics 
[only] because of pain in the eyes.  
Quis nostrum dixerit, quos non pudet ea, quae Stoici aspera dicunt, mala dicere, 
melius esse turpiter aliquid facere cum voluptate quam honeste cum dolore? 
Nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter 
oculorum dolorem (Cic, fin. V: 93; 94) 
A common literary heritage has then the potentiality to entice the philologically 
critical eye of the pagan aristocrat, even if he has an abiding wish only to be counted as 
honourable. Actually having honour is not the pivotal factor of appeal to the reader.  
 
(b) Willingness to believe 
 
Through the 22 books of De Civitate Dei Augustine has to instigate and effect a transition of 
view for the readerwith thematic alteration. Gadamer has stated the following on the term 
transition in this sense:  
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When we find someone transformed we mean precisely this, that he has become 
another person, as it were. There cannot here be any gradual transition leading from 
one to the other, since the one is denial of the other. (Gadamer, 2012, p. 111) 
The here can be referred to the reader in general whom Augustine’s dialectics need to 
convince to such an extent that he becomes congenial with Augustine’s thoughts and the 
conviction which produces them. I would still suppose, given the prodigious length of De 
Civitate Dei that it is an on-going commutation of suppositions rather than a sudden and total 
permutation of conviction which is the process of alignment to Augustine’s teleological 
outlook. And this steady acquisition of perspective insists upon a willingness to believe, ergo 
a volitive act which resonates back to Augustine’s succinct maxim that ‘to believe itself is 
nothing else than think with assent’ (ipsum credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione 
cogitare) (pr. sanct, 2.5).        
 Religious evangelization, which is without visible scientific proof, is quintessentially 
facilitated on the part of the recipient in the forbearance, patience and willingness to consider 
and not exclude a new paradigm, id est the perspectival matrix wherein the evangelical 
message thrives and makes sense. Therefore are the inherent flexibility and openness of the 
pagan reader most crucial catalysts for an effective evangelization.  
 Augustine's official power in society can work as an authority of ethical sentiments 
which are based on a religion not yet shared by all. His audita episcopalis makes him a 
benefactor of the unprivileged (Dagemark, 1995. p. 110), and it is not unlikely that some 
people of the underclass are converted on the grounds of respect towards one’s societally 
superior protector.  But a pagan aristocrat possesses beforehand an equal authority, and an 
epistemology and an ethical outlook, when challenged to permutation, require a ‘leap of 
faith’, as it were.                    
 There is a favoured aphorism of Isaiah’s from the Old Testament, much used and 
discussed by Augustine, that of  ‘nisi crederitis non intelligetis’, ‘unless you believe you will 
not understand’.        
For I [Augustine] ask: If what is not known is not believable, how can children 
perform service to their parents and cherish with obliged duty those whom they 
believe not to be their parents. It simply cannot be known in any way by reason.
28
  
                                                          
28
 Ullo pacto (any agreement) is often used in the ablativus absolutus as an expression and is more meaningfully 
and idiomatically translated as any way. 
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Quaero enim, si quod nescitur, credendum non est, quomodo serviant parentibus 
liberi, eosque mutua pietate diligant, quos parentes suos esse non credant. Non enim 
ratione ullo pacto sciri potest. (util. cred. 12. 26) 
Augustine proceeds to present belief as a criterion for daily social structures and 
relations.This criterion is the oil which makes daily conduit smooth and functioning; it is ‘the 
thought that counts’,  
since what madman would consider a person culpable, one who has offered proper 
obligations to those whom, perhaps, he believes to be his parents, even if they are not?   
nam quis vel insanus eum culpandum putet, qui eis officia debita impenderit quos 
parentes esse crediderit, etiamsi non essent? (ibidem) 
And thus, the very fabric of society is based on belief and credibility between its citizens; and 
that is a sentiment which can be applied even nowadays to societies wherein information 
roam freely and science supplies fact which is immediately not clear to the naked eye.     
Many things can be deduced
29
 whereby it is illustrated that nothing at all of human 




Multa possunt afferri, quibus ostendatur nihil omnino humanae societatis incolume 
remanere, si nihil credere statuerimus, quod non possumus tenere perceptum. (ibidem) 
Likewise no sentiments in De Civitate Dei will remain safe (incolumis remanere) from 
a scepticism which inhibits the welcome of new ideas. This idea of Augustine is found in De 
Utilitate Credendi but is suppoted by sentiments in De Civitate Dei, which develop it 
subtextually and perhaps with a paratextual allusion. The intellect can operate more 
confidently (fidentius) by faith (civ. Dei, XI: 2), and this confidence is justified by the rational 
view that faith in the Wisdom of God, who is the Son of God, extends the intellectual 
participation of God’s essence. The whole of De Civitate Dei as divinely inspired is graspable 
because the reader, just as Augustine the writer, is made in the likeness of God, which again 
can be understood from the Christian philosophy presented therein.  
If that is not possible let at least let it be believed that Man is created in the image of 
God. 
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 Afferri means literally to be brought forth (Simpson, 1977, p.12); and in this case something can be brought 
forth by reason in the argumentation, which in English is to be deduced.  
30
 I insert ‘immediately’ here, because of the locutionary participation of the perfect participle, perceptum, with 
the infinitive tenēre.   
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Si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei. (ibidem)     

























The Fusing of Pagan and Christian Epistemai 
 
AUGUSTINE’S RELATION TO AND USE OF THE “GOLD OF EGYPT”  
 
(a) Useful and harmful Knowledge  
 
The distancing from the traditional Roman conception of the divine is an on-going process for 
Augustine, and this chapter will look at some of his discursive strategies and expose how he 
transform an episteme. Reading Augustine's work as an attempt to address and sway the 
pagan reader necessitates an examination on the way that Augustine handles the totality of his 
own acquaintance with pagan knowledge, id est the whole pagan episteme. In this chapter, I 
assess how Augustine presents the features of this episteme and subsequently relates them 
within a Christian framework, a process which reveals that Augustine, rather than stressing 
out ideological hostility, can find in pagan thought promising elements and appropriate them 
to his own textual agenda. This process I call the fusing of epistemai.   
 Augustine seems aware of his audience and the likely lack of knowledge of patristic 
literature, let alone the directly biblical. In return for undaunted juxtaposition of ideas with 
intellectual maxims of pagan culture, his teleology’s substantiality gains credence through the 
credentials of passing the test, as it were. The turnouts make the Christian teleology the 
champion of logic as the implications of the divergent outlooks are explicated. In spite of the 
dangers of dealing with and  responding to more philosophically consistent rationales, and in 
spite of the even more precarious situation of interposing in his text citations, ultimately 
belonging to a pagan party, Augustine never safely absconds from meticulously presenting 
that which cannot claim to be Christian thought and canon, and fortunately for posterity he 
rather possesses the cornucopias, given the insights which have been nurtured by his 
educational upbringing, to exhaustively confront alternative outlooks.   
 ‘The gold of Egypt’, is alluding to a metaphor of Augustine’s, explicated in De 
Doctrina Christiana, where he compares pagan intellectual valuables, expropriated from 
paganism, with the golden and silver valuables taken out from Egypt in Exodus, among which 
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are garments which the Jews have ‘liberated’ (vindicavisse) and put ‘to better use’ (ad usum 
meliorem) (doc. Chr. II: 40.60). I will dare to ascribe the following rationale of this remark of 
Augustine’s; that likewise one can appropriate whatever truth which may be found outside the 
Scriptures and the church and ‘liberate’ it from the company of pagan erroneousness.  
 This can be supported by another sentiment two chapter later, an unmistakably 
pragmatic statement about pagan literature: 
Whatever man has learnt from other sources; if it hurtful, there it is condemned; if it is 
useful, there it is discovered 
Quidquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est ibi damnatur, si utile est, ibi invenitur. 
(doc. Chr. II: 42.63) 
The transpiration of an accretion of knowledge or of an insight, which is an aid in the search 
for pure truth, is a proviso which Augustine sets to an avid reader of literature. Augustine sees 
theology as philosophy because true philosophy seeks to understand the Wisdom who God is.  
The name itself [φιλοσοφία], if we translate it into English professes love of wisdom. 
Moreover, if wisdom is God through whom all things are made, a fact which divine 
authority and verity has showed, a true philosopher is a lover of God. 
Ipsum nomen si Latine interpretemur, amorem sapientiae profitetur. Porro si sapientia 
Deus est, per quem facta sunt omnia, sicut diuina auctoritas ueritasque monstrauit, 
uerus philosophus est amator Dei. (civ. Dei, VIII: 1) 
He is well-disposed to available wisdom, wherever it can be found, because telos, a 
final cause, effaces unproductive principles, subordinating them to the more pervasive one, 
namely the attainment of Wisdom.Vice versa secular knowledge is injurious (noxium), when 
it impedes the vision of higher verities, even if it does not contradict them. The persistency in 
error is downright hostile to truth. Augustine describes this tendency as  
old depraved opinions hostile to the truth of piety which the long-lasting error of the 
human race has very deeply and persistently fixed in unenlightened minds. 
prauas et ueteres opiniones ueritati pietatis inimicas, quas tenebrosis animis altius et 
tenacius diuturnus humani generis error infixit. (civ. Dei, VII: praef.) 
Hence there are limits to Augustine’s fusing of epistemai, and these limits are more numerous 
where an episteme is more dogmatic and thoroughly outlined in contrast to regular paganism 
as defined by Bonner (vide p. 26). There are those materialist Epicurean and Stoics, denying 
even the immortality of the soul. Bonnie Kent aptly paraphrases the sentiments of De 
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Trinitate, XIII: 7.10 revealing Augustine’s point that the facticity of worldly hardships 
without a prospect of a telos beyond death lowers the goal for eudaemonistic seeking. 
Epicurean and Stoic teleology, advocates that sombre finality of death which Christianity 
manage to avoid and which Augustine ridicules. Kent argues that ‘they choose to redescribe 
the ideals of happiness in such a way that it becomes attainable in this life’ (Kent, 2001, 
“Augustinian Ethics” in Cambridge Companion to Augustine, p.210). In the one sentiment the 
reader would be discouraged to seek truth, and in the other be furnished with a false hope, 
since this life is more justified ‘by the remission of sins then a perfectioning of virtue’ (potius 
remissione peccatorum constet quam perfectione uirtutum) (civ. Dei, XIX: 27). Moreover, 
there are elements of Neo-Platonism like dolatry, superstition and metempsychosis which 
Augustine considers erroneous (Switalski, 1946, p. 107), and they must accordingly, together 
with the Manicheans’ belittlement of God and materialistic perception of evil, be classified as 
harmful (noxius). 
(b) Confirmation of Truth by the pagan Maxims  
 
There is citation from Vergil which is a clear document on how the pagan classics are used by 
Augustine to corroborate his teaching. Augustine hereby proffers a pagan voice to stifle the 
Neo-Platonist rationality behind metempsychosis. In this case in point he explains that 
existential sensations are not only moved by the body but also by mere will which still resides 
in a disembodied soul (ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari). 
“O father is it conceivable that some souls goes hence to heaven exalted and returns 




“o pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum est 
sublimis animas iterumque ad tarda reuerti                
corpora? quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido?”  
(civ. Dei, XIV: 5) 
Utterances of Seneca, Cicero, Vergil, and Varro are often flagrantly used as documentation of 
opinion concurrent with Augustine’s, and as instances of a literary cooperation of the 
Scriptures and pagan literature.        
 Granted that the Bishop of Hippo is first and foremost a quoter of Biblical passages, 
whence most of the information fuelling his teleology is taken, Augustine the quoter is a 
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writer symptomatic of his associative thinking. At the end of the thirteenth chapter of the fifth 
book, he overtly quotes Cicero as a canonical proof for the typical attitude whereby moral 
accountability is misplaced and the activation of a certain number of virtues is arbitrary and 
selective.   
Honour nourishes the arts and everybody is excited towards glorifying studies, and 
those studies which are by everyone disapproved, lie idly about. 
Honos alit artes, omnesque accenduntur ad studia gloria iacentque ea semper, quae 
apud quosque improbantur. (Cicero. Tusc. Disp. I: 2) 
When Augustine explains how demons are unfitting mediators between God and the reader, 
on the grounds that demons have the body of angels but souls more like that of wicked 
humans, Augustine turns his enthymetic reasoning into a complete syllogism with one of 
Sallust’s maxims: 
 For the body is the inferior, thus says even Sallust: “We use the mind to command 
and more often the body to obey”.
32
  
Corpus quippe seruum est, sicut etiam Sallustius ait: “Animi imperio, corporis 
seruitio magis utimur.” (civ. Dei, IX: 9) 
One must decide whether that ‘even’ (etiam) is used with a derogatory intent or a 
monitory one, if we are to assess in general how much gravity Augustine accredits to pithy 
adages of the classic pagan authors. Etiam has a responsive meaning of yes, indeed, truly and 
an additive meaning of and also, even, furthermore. It is a question of how Augustine puts 
them in context and so uses them; one can choose to assume a hypothetical question to the 
response of the quote above or see the citation just as an enforcing supplement to Augustine’s 
argumentation. Either way he has appropriated a property of the pagans to his own benefit.
  Augustine even cites Horace as a backup while explaining that the desire for praise is 
a vice (Horace, Epistulae, I: 50.36-37). Although Horace does not get top marks among the 
classical figures, to others Augustine does not prescind from outright laudable attributes.  
Especially the case of Porphyry (vide below), the most bitter enemy of Christians (inimicus 
acerrimus), suggests a frankness in Augustine’s approach towards his intellectual adversaries 
when this adversary is presented as a most learned man (doctissimus philosophorum) (civ. 
Dei, XIX: 22). Varro is also considered doctissmus (civ. Dei, IV: 1) and Cicero, under the 
frequent appellation of Tullius, is in spite of his Scepticism a serious man (vir gravis) (civ. 
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Dei, I: 27). This respect, which Augustine’s rhetoric exudes in apologetic methodology, helps 
to integrate the episteme of the reader to a new one, while both epistemai are fused by 
common denominators, which are the signification of being doctissimus, gravis et cetera (vide 
p. 28).            
 Augustine is therefore wise with respect to the fairly speedy rupture of the traditional 
world paradigm to which the realm and society, wherein he writes De Civitate Dei, owes a 
great deal. In what Carol Harrison describes as the ‘fractured humanity’
33
, Augustine writes 
De Civitate Dei contra Paganos for the pagans, and all this to a large extent in the language 
and dialectics of the pagans. He bothers to make them comfortable with their own canonical 
aphorisms and places classical maxims as supplements to the Christian argumentation and 
deductions. However, they are thus contextualized that the epistemology of the pagan world, 
which has long since produced them, is opposed; and one can argue that by attacking pagans 
with their own aphoric weapons Augustine impugns more derisively their original capacity to 
sort out a verisimilar epistemology and ethics from each individual sentiment in a consistent 
interconnection. I should therefore now consider what golden jewels there are to be found in 
the pagan episteme which are being corrected and adopted by Augustine, only to be melted 
and fused into his own more interconnected teleological outlook.   
         




Fatum is an intrinsically Roman pagan idea and, translatable into fate or destiny in English, 
and it approximates Augustine’s concept of providence. Providence is the ‘order of causes’ 
(ordo causarum) and the ‘will of God’ (voluntas Dei) (civ. Dei, V: 9). An order of causes is 
the signification of fatum as well, and Augustine’s polemics against the pagan term is mainly 
sprung out from conventional associations of that which misinterprets the will of God, namely 
astrology (constitutio siderum) whose study is pointless (inaniter) (ibidem). Nevertheless, he 
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century as the operative and reactive background for Augustine’s thoughts and experiences, with all its 
expediencies and restrictions.  
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concedes that the etymological basis of the word permits us to use it, if in a completely literal 
sense.   
We cannot use fatum unless we should happen to interpret it from fari (to speak), id 
est to tell or declare, for we cannot deny that [something] is written in the Sacred 
Scriptures.  
Fatum a fando dictum intellegamus, id est a loquendo; non enim abnuere possumus 
esse scriptum in litteris sanctis. (ibidem)    
What is written (scriptum) prophetically must also have been spoken (fatum) by the prophets, 
and in that sense fatum is what humans will perceive and denote as providence. Augustine 
supplies a rejoinder after a rhetorical question about who his God is, an answer which 
promulgates the axiomatic aspect of God’s existence and His effect in the world: 
One can retort “Who is this God, or by what can He be proved worthy of the 
obedience of the Romans so that no one except Him is worshiped with sacrifices?” It 
is great blindness to still ask who God is. God is the very one whose prophets 
predicted what we now perceive’.  
Responderi potest: “Quis iste Deus est aut unde dignus probatur, cui deberent 
obtemperare Romani, ut nullum deorum praeter ipsum colerent sacrificiis?” Magnae 
caecitatis est, adhuc quaerere, quis iste sit Deus. Ipse est Deus, cuius prophetae 
praedixerunt ista quae cernimus. (civ. Dei, XIX: 22) 
Augustine’s reply is pretty straightforward and accredits a considerable authority to the 
prophesies of the Scriptures. However the perception of manifested prophesies also be 
accurate; and a latent possibility of false soothsaying, which will consequently not be written 
down (scriptum esse), is what makes providence in Augustine’s eyes a more precise and 
infallible expression of the cosmic destiny (together with individual destinies) which 
manifests the will of God.         
 In this respect Augustine appreciates the difference between linguistic error and that of 
opinion. In his attack on fatum as erroneous concept contra providence, he concedes that 
people actually use fatum in the providential sense of Christianity, but the pagan reader 
should not do so lest the conventionality of language conflate important distinctions, since he 
should disprove astrology and dismantle his old polytheistic cosmology in his episteme. 
Hence a conventional signification of fatum is disparaged but an etymologically based 
resignification is permitted.Augustine thus set the bounds for the pagan aristocrat: ‘Let him 
keep his sentiments [and] correct his language’ (sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat) (civ. Dei 
V: 1).            
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 Even more leniently vis-à-vis his pagan reader, Augustine in fact tries to conjoin the 
pagan understanding of fatum with that of God’s will. Quite interestingly Augustine states 
that God’s will is proved (probāre) to be indistinguishable from fatum by Aeneus Seneca
34
, 
and the Bishop of Hippo then proceeds to quote a sequence from Epistula CVII of this famous 
pagan stoic. Besides imputing a conspicuous authority to a pagan author by using the verb 
probāre, Augustine has nearly fully accepted the term used within his enemies’ religiosity. 
Furthermore there is an opinion of Augustine’s which surmises a pagan version of providence 
which is equivalent to his own in its connection to an omnipotent volition. He says that  
[the pagans] name Jove the one whom they think to be the highest god, and from 
whom they say the chain of fates hang. 
Iouem appellant quem summum deum putant, a quo conexionem dicunt pendere 
fatorum. (civ. Dei, V: 8).   
The chain of fates (conexio fatorum) is depended on Jove, and this is the god with whom 




As late as in 390 C.E. Augustine actually poses the following question to the interlocutor of 
his Epistula XVI:            
Who can bear that the lightening wielding Zeus is deprioritized [for the sake of a more 
obscure divinity] called Miggo. 
 Quis enim ferat Iovi fulmina vibranti praeferri Mygdonem? (ep. XVI: 2) 
The query could be that of a Roman pagan aristocrat, albeit the overall purpose of the letter is 
ultimately to defend monotheism. Even though by the time he has begun writing De Civitate 
Dei, Augustine seems to be more hostile and condescending to any comparative approach of 
traditional deities; but he evidently still carries with him enough insight from former years to 
employ dialectics immersed in pagan epistemology. Fusing the epistemai of paganism and 
Christianity is simply symptomatic of Augustine’s mission to explain Christianity and argue 
factually against paganism, and not solely to vent out his frustration or anger; consequently 
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his rebuttal of polytheism is gradual and careful.      
 Conflating Jove with God, as seen in the deliberation on fatum, is one example of this 
deliberate approach to pagan religiosity. Towards the end of De Civitate Dei he juxtaposes 
God directly with Jupiter, (civ. Dei, XIX: 20)
35
, which nevertheless does not mean that the 
traditional picture of Jove is correspondent to the Holy Trinity; but the pagan reader is 
indicated to severely lack in knowledge about his own supreme god. Even Porphyry is 
admitted participation, however peripheral, of the divine mystery (vide below). Ergo, when 
Augustine finally presents his true God, he subsumes Him under the epistemai of both 
traditional pagan religion and that of a fiercely hostile Neo-Platonist.    
 The plausible objective of conceding ten books for the discussion of the old Roman 
paradigm, even if it is there only to be refuted, is the occasion to transform an ancient pagan 
mind with a mind receptive to God. Augustine could just as well have said that Jupiter has 
nothing to do whatsoever with the Christian, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent God; 
but as Jupiter had some good he can stimulate a provisory though imperfect affiliation with 
God, which is evoked for the sake of expediency of informing a pagan reader, and maybe 
even converting him. Inasmuch the telos of the reader as a creature is implied to be 
cooperative in the world in ways a pagan can perceive, albeit incompletely and erroneously, 
the pagan reader’s episteme is at that point generously included in a wider cosmological 
spectre.            
 Another most defining example of a pedagogical fusion of epistemological horizons 
executed with regular commutation of the reader’s paradigm is that Augustine does not at all 
shun from putting deus in the plural, even after it has been unquestionably established that 
there is only One True God (solus est Deus verus) (civ. Dei, IV: 33).   
 Angels is what substitute the notion of the gods’ wisdom and graciousness. 
Unfortunately all interaction the reader’s might have had with beings above humans that has 
felt genuine, cannot have been with angels, as they are paradoxically unfitting mediators, 
though good as they are as messengers, ‘for those who always see the face of the Father [of 
the Trinity] should announce His will’
36
. The reason, however, for their unfitness in 
negotiating between God and humans is that they share neither in the misery of humans nor in 
human mortality. Only daemons as miserable spirits and Christ as mortal can function as 
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mediators, of whom only the latter’s brokerage can obliterate misery and mortality in the 
human condition (civ. Dei, IX: 15). Thus Augustine never blatantly exclaims “ye shalt not 
believe in many gods!”, but merely professes the consequences of polytheism, with 
confusion, misperception and a multitude of definition of what is to be honoured and 
worshipped. Nevertheless Augustine’s thorough confrontation with pagan religiosity is not 




Oracles have been a great part of Roman culture, so much so that ‘the oracular, the mantic, 
the prophetic is something that can scarcely be contained by civic or religious authorities’ 
(Johnson, 2009, p.102), and they are perhaps so ingrained in Augustine that to impart truthful 
utterances to oracles would not be awkward even as a Catholic Bishop. On the contrary 
oraculus is the word which Augustine uses as a Latin speaking Roman citizen to designate 
divine revelation in the Scriptures. When Abraham learns from God of the Promised Land 
which will be given to him, it is through an oracle (oraculo tertio dixit Dominus ad Abraham) 
(civ. Dei, XVI: 21).           
 As for oracles which do not have the guarantee of the Bible, the criterion is that 
whatever broadcasted traceable to some veritable fact might be inspired by God. In his 
Epistula CCLVIII Augustine enmeshes a pre-existent oracular interpretation and adopts it to a 
Christian outlook, citing the Bucolics, IV 13-14; after stating the original author’s (Publius 
Vergilius Maro’s) source, he adds: 
Perhaps even this oracle had heard something in her spirit about the Saviour, which 
she had to reveal by necessity.  
Fortassis etiam illa vates aliquid de unico salvatore in spiritu audierat, quod necesse 
habuit confiteri.  (ep. CCLVIII:5) 
This is written in 423 C.E. only three years before De Civitate Dei is completed and over 
three decades after Augustine has become an ordained cleric in the Church. In the case of 
Vergil’s alleged proclamation of the Baby Jesus, Augustine is the concluding arbiter of 
whether the proclamation of the soothsayer be divinely inspired or not. But Augustine 
demonstrates even greater liberality in De Civitate Dei, since there he gives to Porphyry the 
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judgement to consider (putāre) which oracles are divine (dei), and hence to set the criterion of 
truthfulness:  
He is God whom Porphyry, the most learned among philosophers, though most 
ardently hostile to Christians, admitted to be a great god, even in agreement with those 
oracles which he considered to be divine. 
Ipse est Deus, quem doctissimus philosophorum, quamuis Christianorum acerrimus 
inimicus, etiam per eorum oracula, quos deos putat, deum magnum Porphyrius 
confitetur. (civ. Dei, XIX: 22) 
Contradictory to this is Augustine’s quite subsequent accusation of a certain oracular 
utterance being in reality an invective fabrication against Christians by ‘a clever man’ (ab 
homine callido eoque Christianis inimicissimo haec oracula fuisse conficta) (civ. Dei, XIX: 
23) and thus Augustine pulls apart the believability of oracles as deliberate truth tellers. The 
truth is revealed unwittingly, as seen by Augustine admissions, when it so happens to be, and 
therefore it is not the oracles ipso facto which are to be taken seriously but truth per se 
‘wherever it can be found’. For the author of 22 voluminous books with basically one scope, 
silence is not golden but truth is, as golden as the vestments vindicated from Egypt by the 







































Using One’s Power in a teleologically correct Manner 
 
UTI OR FRUI? 
Uti and frui are two Latin verbal infinitives which respectively mean to use and to enjoy. 
Their importance for Augustine’s discourse, wherein he explicates the ethical road conducive 
to the attainment of telos based on performativity and will, is not to be underestimated, both 
as regards the clear locutionary presence of the two notions and the illocutionary implications 
which then entail in the on-going teleological discourse. The juxtaposition of uti and frui is 
another example of dialectical heritage from classical texts. Augustine is indeed not the first 
person who has compared uti and frui in philosophical exegesis. Exempli gratia, Seneca
37
 
frequently juxtaposed the two terms, and the most model example thereof may be in his De 
Vita Beata, I: 5: ‘You enjoy lust, I use it’ (tu voluptate frueris, ego utor). Albeit it is in an 
unlikely sentence in Augustinian ethics, it approximates Augustine’s interplay with the verbs; 
Augustine follows a semantic tradition but adopts it for Christian terminological exigency. 
That is a tendency which adumbrates many other conscious applications of centuries-old 
Latin words and notions; and that is why a philological method to conjecture the reception of 
Augustine’s sentiment by a pagan reader is apt.      
 To grasp profounder the concept of vanitas the reader must already have apprehended 
the uti-frui distinction which is never explicitly defined in De Civitate Dei.  One needs to look 
to De Doctrina Christiana for a lucid and concrete exposition. There Augustine also provides 
for a clear-cut delineation of their effect by ethical orientation; id est he mentions the pivotal 
consequence ensuing the misapplication of the acts and orientations which these notions 
signify: 
There are some things to be used and others things to be enjoyed, but some who both 
use and enjoy.
38
 Those things which are to be enjoyed make us happy, and those to be 
used help in the direction of happiness and are a sort of support for us so that we may 
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arrive at the enjoyable and stick to it. Indeed we who, being placed among these 
things, both enjoy and use them, if we would like to enjoy the things which are there 
to be used, our course will be obstructed and even sometimes change path, the 
consequence of which is that we ourselves are either delayed from obtaining the 
enjoyable or even turn away from them as we are entangled by love of inferior things.   
Res…aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et 
utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est nos beatos faciunt; istis quibus utendum est 
tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuuamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos 
beatos faciunt, peruenire atque his inhaerere possimus. Nos uero qui fruimur et 
utimur, inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, impeditur 
cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur, ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum est 
obtinendis vel retardemur uel etiam revocemur, inferiorum amore praepediti. (doc. 
Chr. I: 3.3) 
Uti and frui have their firm distinctive, even sometimes disparate place and functioning vis-à-
vis the very telos that makes them complementary to each other. They are the main verbal 
protagonists in Augustine’s teleological ethics; of which uti invest the most versatile role
39
, 
and strictly speaking the only ‘thing to be enjoyed is the Father and the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, that one and only Trinity’ (doc. Chr. I: 5.5)
40
. All corporeal and temporal things are on 
the other hand for usage on the ontic journey to the spiritual and eternal peace of the City of 
God. The notion of uti imparts significance into every act, and the lack or presence of utility 
in respect to the advancement towards telos naturally monitors the respective teleological 
value which that act would possess. Using is conducive to the eventual enjoyment 
experienced in a teleological fulfilment and enjoying is what in turn inspires that conducive 
using.            
 Frui is however not only translatable as to enjoy, and the constant rendering of this 
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To use something is to dispose it to the faculty of volition; but to enjoy is to use with a joy of the thing 
used and not just with anticipated joy of a future thing. Hence everyone who enjoys, uses; for he 
consign something to the faculty of volition for purpose of enjoyment. But not everyone who uses, 
enjoys, not if that, which he attempts to commit at the disposal of the will, is for the sake of something 
else and not per se.   
Uti est enim assumere aliquid in facultatem uoluntatis; frui est autem uti cum gaudio non adhuc spei 
sed iam rei. Proinde omnis qui fruitur utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem uoluntatis cum fine 
delectationis. Non autem omnis qui utitur fruitur si id quod in facultatem uoluntatis assumit non propter 
illud ipsum sed propter aliud appetiuit. (Trin, X: 4: 17) 
This excerpt is from De Trinitate, but a pertinent example nonetheless for the delineation of Augustine’s 
predisposition on this topic in general; it further stresses the watershed between the two terms of uti and frui, 
delimits the applicability of frui and shows that the using one’s power beneficially is an act of volition. As an act 
of volition as a common denominator this effects that uti and frui are not diametrically opposed to each other in 
the discourse of Augustine’s teleology. 
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 Res igitur quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, eademque Trinitas. (doc. Chr. I: 5.5) 
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verb in English into to enjoy obscures some of the original communication in the verb. The 
aristocratic reader already knows the word but in different contexts. In forensic speech frui 
means to have the use and enjoyment of; in other more colloquial contexts it simply means to 
have the benefit of. Cicero has applied frui in an egoistic sense in the basic meaning to enjoy, 
when the instrumental or causal ablative is voluptate (Simpson, 1977, p. 257). Fructus, the 
completed or perfect tense of this deponent verb is associated with the homophonic noun 
fructus, which aside from enjoyment means in financial and agrarian expressions proceeds, 
profit, produce and fruit. Augustine himself reminds us of these other uses of fructus and frui: 
But we still use proceeds and enjoy practices in the mode of speech which is obtained 
by convention; for the fruits of the fields are an appropriate appellation of the agrarian 
produce which we all certainly use temporarily.  
Verum tamen eo loquendi modo, quem pius obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur et 
usibus fruimur; nam et fructus iam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes 
temporaliter utimur. (civ. Dei, XI: 25)    
Nobody enjoys the harvest as the ultimate end in itself, but Augustine appreciates how 
his language reflects the immediate impression of what one is experiencing
41
. Accordingly I 
do not think that Augustine implies that the enjoyment experienced during and after a useful 
act is totally inappropriate. Making a bold but plausible conjecture based on another passage 
in De Doctrina Christiana (doc. Chr. I: 4.4), I would propose that one must understand the 
conscious experience of uti and frui as a twofold teleological step whereon the immanence of 
God comes to be intelligibly tangible in the occasion of provisory but nevertheless authentic 
enjoyment in this world. If God is the only thing to be enjoyed, then what is meant by those 
enjoyable things (res) in the plural in the extended citation above?  The visual realization of 
the eternal and spiritual occurs in the understanding (intellecta conspici) (civ. Dei, XXII: 29) 
of those thing whose properties are closer affiliated with God’s essence; and such an 
indication that one is on ‘the right track’ is in the moment of revelation understandably 
enjoyable. Analogically the power of the aristocratic pagan reader can plausibly be 
experienced as an enjoyment, either morally as when it is exercised in accord with Christian 
teleology, or immorally and therefore falsely as when in conflict or outright derision of the 
perspective educed from the text of De Civitate Dei.     
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 The perspective is contingent upon the idea that in heaven the activity of uti is 
replaced by that of frui in a communion characterized as ‘a most harmonious group of 
individuals, enjoying God and enjoying each other in God’ (concordissima societas fruendi 
Deo et invicem in Deo) ( civ. Dei, XIX: 17). Secular society is not to be teleologically enjoyed 
but only used, because of its fickleness and the appertaining disturbances which no power of 
any pagan aristocrat can stem.    
This [society] is mostly divided against itself in quarreling, waging war and fighting, 
and in seeking either victories that cost lives or certainly fleeting ones.  
Ista aduersus se ipsam plerumque diuiditur litigando, bellando atque pugnando et aut 
mortiferas aut certe mortales uictorias requirendo (civ. Dei, XV: 4)  
Indeed a society in such a state is according to Augustinian deduction not even useful for 
reader, other than as a test of virtue (virtutis examen) (civ. Dei, IV, 3). Uti is inferred to be a 
teleological act only if the act be referred to something good (bonum) (div.qu, XXX) because 
only good things is purposive to the attainment of God. ‘Therefore whoever uses something 
badly, does not use it’ (non ergo utitur, quisquis male utitur) (ibidem), not at least for what it 
is intended, and thus one disrupts the teleological trajectory ordained by God. Likewise but 
more paradoxically enjoying can entail misery, even if one enjoys something one loves; ‘for 
many who love that which ought not to be loved, are miserable, and when enjoying it, they 
are even more miserable (multi enim amando ea, quae amanda non sunt, miseri sunt et 
miseriores cum fruuntur ) (civ. Dei, VIII: 8).      
 If, as Augustine says, only God is to be enjoyed, how can society assure true 
enjoyment for its citizens? The fact is that it cannot by itself provide sublime happiness, but 
merely aid and pinpoint the telos towards which it must strive with its people and present at 
disposal the surroundings in which a genuine striving is possible on a more private level. 
Augustine’s rhetorical positioning of uti and frui hallmarks a summary cosmopolitan outlook 
and alludes to a waypoint whereat one of the two societies, namely the City of Men and the 
City of God, must be selected.   
Good [people] use the world to this purpose of enjoying God; but wicked [people], 
want
42
 to use God in order to enjoy the world.  
Boni quippe ad hoc utuntur mundo, ut fruantur Deo; mali autem contra, ut fruantur 
mundo, uti uolunt Deo. (civ. Dei, XV: 7)
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 They want to but cannot, due to the omnipotence they are up against. 
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Distinctive moral allegiances are treated as traits definite to each city, and the pagan aristocrat 
by the formula of using and enjoying must choose how he wants to expend his power.  
   
POTESTAS AND CONSŪLERE 
(a) Power 
 
In context things are frequently used to aid a greater whole. The bible uses tropes and figures 
to convey divine messages and not as ostentatious ends in themselves. 




Iste autem tropus, id est modus locutionis, fit, quando id quod dicitur longe est 
amplius, quam quod eo dicto significatur. (civ. Dei, XVI: 21) 
Likewise one’s official power has to signify something analogically far greater. A pertinent 
instance thereof would be concerning the treatment of slaves as human beings with their own 
teleological value.          
 Having no delusions about the plight of many slaves Augustine maintains that slavery 
is a consequence of the Fall of Man (civ. Dei, XIX: 15). Originally only the irrational creation 
was to be subjugated by humans. Humans have been made rational, as a common endowment, 
in God’s image (rationalem factum ad imaginem suam) (civ. Dei, XIX: 17). Therefore a 
human being has never been intended for enslavement by another human being, even though 
Augustine admits slavery as a just burden for sin
44
. The aristocratic reader is not to hold and 
treat slaves as if servility is a natural state, like an inborn system of caste. With pertinent 
argumentation he resorts to etymological speculation and explains the origin of the word 
servus in the Latin language:  
The origin, however, of the word servus in the Latin language is believed to come 
from when those who could be killed by martial law were preserved; they were made 
servants, a name derived from their preservation. That was something which could not 
happen without the desert of sin, because, also when a just war is waged, the adversary 
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fights back by sinning; and all victories, even when it accrues to the wicked, are the 
result of divine judgement which seeks to humble the vanquished either by removing 
or by punishing their sins.  
Origo autem uocabuli seruorum in Latina lingua inde creditur ducta, quod hi, qui iure 
belli possent occidi, a uictoribus cum seruabantur serui fiebant, a seruando appellati; 
quod etiam ipsum sine peccati merito non est. Nam et cum iustum geritur bellum, pro 
peccato e contrario dimicatur; et omnis uictoria, cum etiam malis prouenit, diuino 
iudicio uictos humiliat uel emendans peccata uel puniens. (civ. Dei, XIX: 15) 
So slavery is a corollary of sin and 
consequently we do not read the word ‘slave’ in any part of Scripture before the 
righteous Noah appropriated the sin of his son with this appellation.  
proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus seruum, antequam hoc uocabulo Noe iustus 
peccatum filii uindicaret. (civ. Dei, XIX: 15) 
The sin is a slave to the son’s vices, and thus the concept of submission is the 
qualification of slavery and not the official arrangement, which is merely a consequence of 
that the idea thereof being manifested on a societal basis. An aristocrat in the Late Roman 
Empire has some power (potestas)
45
 to a lesser or greater degree, but unless he would possess 
the will, aided by Augustine’s teleological input, to view his own authority and his own 
ability to control people’s actions in a wider teleological framework, that power could become 
an impediment to confronting truth and avoid both extrinsic and intrinsic vanity; for, abusing 
his power, he would sin.  
O wretch who had the possibility to sin!
46
 
O miserum, cui peccare licebat! (civ. Dei, V: 26)  
As a result Augustine can denominate him as ‘a slave, and not to one man but, what is more 
troublesome, to as many masters as he has vices’ (civ. Dei,  IV: 3)
47
, and to follow up on any 
teleological sentiment, as can be distilled from De Civitate Dei, is hard enough without 
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having plenty of other masters keeping one occupied.     
 Otherwise there is nothing wrong with exercising just power, even though obedience 
seems coaxed. Power is not intrinsically a distortion of justice; it is only so if misused. 
Pride is neither the fault of the dispenser of power, nor of the power itself, but is the 
fault of the soul who inordinately loves its own power while a more just power of a 
mightier one is held in contempt.  
Nec superbia uitium est dantis potestatem uel ipsius etiam potestatis, sed animae 
peruerse amantis potestatem suam potentioris iustiore contempta. (civ. Dei, XII: 8) 
The mightier one (potentior) is clearly inferred here as God to whom all the power of the 
pagan aristocrat must be devoted. The pagan reader is told that his power is teleologically 
legitimate as long as he uses it for the proper ends and realizes that there are grades of power, 
from whose summit he as a mere human aristocrat, will always be far, just as there are grades 
of individual capacities.          
 Latin has a convenient etymological coherence between the noun potestas which 
means power
48
and posse, which means to be able. This makes it more lucid the logic of the 
semantic relationship of the noun and the verb than the Germanic equivalents in respectively 
English, German and Norwegian: might and can, Macht and können, makt and kunne. Power 
is nothing else than the constancy of possibilities to effect or affect something. Pride beyond 
self-dignity, id est superbia, is on the other hand that which corrupts power; and thus the old 
saying that ‘power corrupts’ is rendered obsolete, since it is in fact the same thing which 
corrupts power that in the end debases its proprietor, namely the act of volition in abusing and 
enjoying inordinately (vide p. 44, note 39). The citation from De Civitate Dei above (XII: 8) 
imbues the agent, the holder and dispenser of power with the ultimate responsibility and 
exonerates the notion of power as an automatically pejorative notion. When power is 
exercised by politicians to be instrumental (uti) and not exerted for its own sake (frui), it can 
be exercised with a proper understanding of telos for the good of humanity, so that people are 
united in a state nearest as possible to the eudemonia in the City of God; and one can get a 
clearer picture thereof with sociolinguistic attentiveness. 
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(b) Consulting  
 
Here an expatiation upon the verb consūlere is in order; for the verb adumbrates the 
benevolent purpose of power, seeing that the dative consūlere has the meaning of ‘taking 
council for someone or something’, ‘having regard of the interest of someone’, or simply 
‘look to’ (e.g. “I will look into it”) (Simpson, 1977, p. 144). Consūlere is politically connoted, 
intertwined with the apprehension of the Latin world and culture of the Romans. Consulate, 
the most prestigious office in the famous cursus honorum of a Roman’s political career, has a 
function to which the verb is conscientiously linked.  
Hence it is that, not tolerating regal domination, [the Romans] nominated two generals 
for a year in office (annua imperia), who were called consuls from the verb to consult 
and not regents or lords connoted with reigning and lording. 
Hinc est quod regalem dominationem non ferentes annua imperia binosque 
imperatores sibi fecerunt, qui consules appellati sunt a consulendo, non reges aut 
domini a regnando atque dominando (civ. Dei, V: 12) 
The Romans see a consul as someone honourable and beneficial to the state in stark contrast 
to a king (rex). Domination at a whim is ruled out in the very etymology of the office; and so 
a more reasonable teleology lies behind a consul’s imperious decisions.   
 Exuding this rationale, a consulate instils more readily loyalty from those it seeks to 
control. I would suggest that consūlere for Augustine is virtually a teleological form of 
commanding as it invites a mode of ruling with the telos of the ruled in mind. The Romans 
seem to have a proper understanding of short term teleology
49
 of authority, seeing that the 
consuls had been the two most powerful men in and for The Roman Republic for well near 
half a millennium.           
 In De Civitate Dei Augustine reveals the established microcosmic social contracts and 
power relationships in late antiquity which he accepted. Augustine’s discursive strategy is to 
remain within the bounds of long-established conventionalities, while he indicates an order of 
propriety: 
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 Neither in short is term or long term teleology is consulting God possible, because He is His own telos and 
that of the would-be consultant.  
Nobody could have said that they had been taking care of a fountain, having drunk therefrom, or claim 
to had provided for light by having seen.  




So from here domestic peace has its provenience, id est the agreement of those living 
together on who are to obey and who are to command. For those who look for the 
interest of others, they are issuing commands; just as there are issued orders from 
husband to wife, parent to child, master to slave. Those whose interests are regarded, 
they obey; just as it is for women vis á vis their spouses, children vis á vis their 
parents, servants vis á vis their masters. 
50
 
Hinc itaque etiam pax domestica oritur, id est ordinata imperandi oboediendique 
concordia cohabitantium imperant enim, qui consulunt; sicut uir uxori, parentes filiis, 
domini seruis. Oboediunt autem quibus consulitur; sicut mulieres maritis, filii 
parentibus, serui dominis. (civ. Dei, XIX: 14)  
What is detractable from the excerpt above is the vindication of obidience, which, rather than 
collapsing into opposition to self-assertiveness, impedimental to the dignity due to oneself as 
a human being, is performed because one is looked after. One obeys the laws of the state 
apparatus which in turn protects the individual from pure and arbitrary coercion, the very 
coercion which is not necessary if the right form of command is issued.   
 Admittedly the propriety of consūlere is delegated only to those who are “best suited” 
only by a conventional proviso. If one is to go along with the idea that those who are best 
suited are entitled to rule, Augustine would hereby imply that husbands know better than 
wives, father than sons and master than slaves. So Augustine is a man of his times but within 
his episteme he has carefully offered consulting as an axiomatic concomitancy with righteous 
authority and ordinate obedience in a kind of quid pro quo; the sentiments goes like oboediunt 
autem quibus consulitur and not quibus imperatur. Command does not by default imply 
subsequent coercion; it is purely an utterance with perlocutionary intent of realization, to put 
it somewhat technically. Consūlere is to command with consideration, with consideration to 
what is actually commanded and with consideration towards those who obey the command. 
To command without any consideration is to impart one’s will on other human beings as if 
one’s more elevated nature makes the will of others automatically subservient and 
deprioritized.            
 In that perspective Augustine aptly uses consūlere purely as a verb of virtue, when he 
applauds the ancient Romans in putting their country before themselves ‘with generous 
counselling’ (consilio libero) (civ. Dei, V: 15), 
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for they do not command with the lust for rule but from the sense of duty to consult 
the interest of others, not from pride of authority but from compassion for providing.  
neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi nec principandi 
superbia, sed prouidendi misericordia. (civ. Dei, XIX: 14) 
Authority is as with power alluded to as having no innately negative traits, but it needs 
qualification of which Augustine herewith presents the concomitant duty to consult (officio 
consulendi), logically juxtaposed with a compassionate inclination to taking charge 
(provedendi misericordia).  Likewise those pagan aristocratic readers, who are also 
paterfamilias
51
, have fulfilled their role well, if with that duty and compassion in mind of 
Christian religiosity.   
Those who are true paterfamilias will urge everyone in the household as sons to 
worship and merit God. 
Qui autem ueri patres familias sunt, omnibus in familia sua tamquam filiis ad 
colendum et promerendum Deum consulunt. (civ. Dei, XIX: 16) 
 
(c) The true Motive and true Authority of Power 
 
The society on earth (civitas terrena) bears some similarities to the real, id est eternal civitas, 
but it has fundamental deficiencies. It is not eternal (sempiterna non erit) (civ. Dei, XV: 4), 
and therefore any power therein is hinted to be a means to an end and not an end in itself.  No 
worldly power and political action can have any justification without the teleological sanction 
of God, no matter how omnipresent and omnipotent it may seem. 
That was an elegant and frank answer which the captured pirate gave to Alexander the 
Great. When the famous king questioned the pirate why it seemed to him that the 
ocean should be infested, the pirate [asked in return] with liberal contumacy: “What do 
you mean by infesting the whole earth? Because I scourge with a small ship, I am 
called a bandit, and because you do it with a navy you are called a general.”  
Eleganter enim et ueraciter Alexandro illi Magno quidam comprehensus pirata 
respondit. Nam cum idem rex hominem interrogaret, quid ei uideretur, ut mare 
haberet infestum, ille libera contumacia: Quod tibi, inquit, ut orbem
 
terrarum; sed 
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quia id ego exiguo nauigio facio, latro uocor; quia tu magna classe, imperator. (civ. 
Dei, IV: 4)   
Nevertheless, as showed in the excerpt from the nineteenth book of De Civitate Dei, it is the 
sacrificial attitude of serving one’s country which makes plundering in the name of an Empire 
relatively better than acting similarly for one’s own personal benefit. This proclivity for 
sacrifice does not, however, convey true saintliness. Those aristocrats who behave well with 
their power because of wanted respect from one’s fellow men, and not by the power of the 
Holy Spirit by the faith of piety ‘does not achieve holiness but are simply less base’ (non 
quidem iam sancti, sed minus turpes sunt) (civ. Dei, V: 13). ‘It is therefore without doubt 
better that this lust is resisted than yielded to’ (civ. Dei, V: 14)
52
.    
 Augustine further postulates what distinguishes true virtuous people from apparently 
virtuous people. It is this: That in the former there resides a greater love for truth than for 
human praise (ibidem). This is a provision Augustine infuses in a dilemma, wherein truth is 
deprioritized as second rate and societal procedures get in trouble. In the case of extracting 
truthful information during lawsuits torture is prevalent at the time of Augustine, and its ill-
considered congruency with genuine truth is acutely discerned by him. He says: 
If one has chosen, according to the wisdom of some men
53
, to die rather than endure 
longer the torments, one will plead guilty even though one is innocent. When the 
tormented is found guilty and put to death, the judge is still uncertain whether or not 
he has killed the real culprit or an innocent person whom he has tortured lest he kill in 
ignorance an innocent; consequently the judge has tortured someone to learn about his 
innocence and killed him while not yet
54
 knowing about it.   
Si enim secundum istorum sapientiam elegerit ex hac uita fugere quam diutius illa 
sustinere tormenta: quod non commisit, commisisse se dicit. Quo damnato et occiso, 
utrum nocentem an innocentem iudex occiderit, adhuc nescit, quem ne innocentem 
nesciens occideret torsit; ac per hoc innocentem et ut sciret torsit, et dum nesciret 
occidit. (civ. Dei, XIX: 6) 
A judge employed in the state apparatus is a human being and ultimately answerable 
to God. Every human is responsible to God whose authority justifies and condemns any act. 
Augustine compares the illicit arbitrariness of a private soldier acting in disregard of his 
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 Huic igitur cupiditati melius resistitur sine dubitatione quam ceditur. (civ. Dei, V: 14) 
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 The anaphoric istorum (of those) intrudes in the flow of the translation, if it is made literal. 
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general, to that of any human vis-à-vis God. This exemplifies what Augustine deems to be the 
precariousness of self-reliance:  
When a soldier kills a person, being obedient to the authorities under whichever he is 
lawfully placed, he would not be indicted for homicide by any law of the sate. On the 
contrary, unless he has killed the man, he would be accused of being a deserter of the 
[Roman] Empire and of holding it in contempt. The [same thing]
55
, if done at his own 
whim and authority, would incur the incrimination of having spilled human blood. 
Miles cum oboediens potestati, sub qualibet legitime constitutus est, hominem occidit, 
nulla ciuitatis suae lege reus est homicidii, immo, nisi fecerit, reus est imperii deserti 
atque contempti; quod si sua sponte atque auctoritate fecisset, crimen effusi humani 
sanguinis incidisset. (civ. Dei, I: 26) 
So it is the will of God which in the last instance decides whether or not an act is 
useful or not and therefore permissible or sometimes obligatory. Even standard a priori 
precepts are rendered to no more than rules with room for exceptions. There is of course a 
fine but often fatal line between receiving an actual divine invocation and injunction and 
psychologically imagining these for one’s own private benefit, which has often been a 
potential problem in enthusiastic religion, but Augustine seems satisfied with this terse 
warning at the question on suicide: 
Therefore the one who has heard it is not permitted to kill oneself, he may commit 
suicide if God, whose orders it is not lawful to disparage, orders it, provided that the 
person in question be
 
very sure that a divine command has been issued.
56
   
Qui ergo audit non licere se occidere, faciat, si iussit cuius non licet iussa 
contemnere; tantummodo uideat utrum diuina iussio nullo nutet incerto. (civ. Dei, I: 
26)  
As adumbrated by Augustine, such a complete gravity centred on the will of God, subsuming 
one’s own, guides the soul to true peace of which I will discuss in the following chapter. 
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One should enjoin oneself to the Peace of the City of God by 
eschewing Vanitas (Vanity) and confronting Veritas (Truth) 
 
VARIETIES OF PEACE 
(a) Peace as an axiomatic Necessity  
 
Robert Dodaro  states that Augustine’s ‘religious and moral use of terms like justice (iustitia) 
and its allied civic virtues, such as piety (pietas) and mercy (misericordia), consistently 
overlaps with his political usage of them’ (Dodaro, 2004, p. 77). Filial piety (pietas), pity 
(misericordia) and justice (iustitia) (vide chapter five passim) are seen as being fulfilled 
rather than challenged by a Christian ethical outlook. This is a tendency of Augustine’s 
which, I would claim, also includes pax
57
; and that provides an indispensable link between the 
pagan and politically conscious reader and the rubric of peace in the teleology of De Civitate 
Dei.            
 Particularly with pax the overt overlap is a communicative asset for the teleological 
message which is eponymous with the title of this chapter, namely that one should enjoin 
oneself to the peace of the City of God, by avoiding vanity and confronting truth.  
Augustine’s emphasis on vanity and verity is much more needed to be extrapolated into his 
texts that what he sees as an axiomatic wish for peace (civ. Dei, XIX: 12). That is why it is 
rather the self-evident necessity and usage of peace, (even of wicked men), that is explicitly 
discussed by Augustine: 
Wars are waged with peace as their purpose, even by those who indulge their warlike 
disposition in commanding and fighting. Hence it is clear that peace is the most 
desirable end of war; because every human seeks peace by waging war, but nobody 
seeks war by peacemaking.  
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Pacis…intentione geruntur et bella, ab his etiam, qui uirtutem bellicam student 
exercere imperando atque pugnando. Vnde pacem constat belli esse optabilem finem. 
Omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem requirit; nemo autem bellum 
pacificando. (civ. Dei, XIX: 12) 
  Augustine shrewdly argues that even peace which is disturbed is occasioned by a 
craving for yet another peace more suitable to those who interrupted the initial peace (ut ea 
[pax] sit quam uolunt) (civ. Dei, XIX: 12). I think it applies irrespectively whether the peace 
is disturbed by good or bad people, because at the most private level each human seeks to 
achieve ataraxia, which is peace of one’s own mind.   
It is even necessary for a thing perverted to be both on accords with some part of the 
order of things and be peaceful in it and exist or by it continue to remain firm [in its 
perversity] otherwise it would not be at all. 
Quod autem peruersum est, etiam hoc necesse est ut in aliqua et ex aliqua et cum 
aliqua rerum parte pacatum sit, in quibus est uel ex quibus constat; alioquin nihil 
esset omnino. (civ. Dei, XIX: 12)  
Thus Augustine equipoises existent natures with peace, because every nature is created from 
God; and this theory he takes all the way. ‘Not even the nature of the Devil Himself is evil’, 
Augustine acknowledges and the very fact that Satan suffers in Hell is an indication of some 
residue of goodness; ‘for if nothing good was left, he [the Devil] could not be in pains for the 
good that has been lost’ (civ. Dei, XIX: 13)
58
. Preceding these sentiments Augustine has most 
interestingly maintained that Hell is in fact a place where some peace remains because of the 
congruency between the activities in Hell and the original nature of the inhabitants 
(quantacumque congruentia coaptantur). If they were all rejoicing in hell they would all go 
against their nature and that would be much worse. Hence Hell is paradoxically a place of 
order bringing about ‘some tranquillity’ (ordinis tranquillitas) and ‘therefore some peace’ 
(ergo nonnulla pax) in that dreadful place (ibidem). Regrettably for the Devil, God will 
always be his nature’s telos, and he will therefore never be whole as himself. The Devil’s 
nature subsists in God (civ. Dei, XXII: 24) and in spite of the Devil’s reduced being he still 
exists on some level (aliquo modo)
59
.       
 Moreover, in order to bring about this private peace, another peace with one’s closest 
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 Nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est… Nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum 
amissum dolere non posset. (civ. Dei, XIX: 23)     
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 Quando quidem, ut ipsius quoque diaboli natura subsistat, ille facit qui summe est et facit esse quidquid aliquo 




neighbour is welcome, either for egoistic or for selfless reasons, but only the selfless person 
will actually achieve ataraxia, for an altruistic state of mind bears a closer resemblance to God 
whom Augustine depicts as utterly gratuitous towards mankind. God’s final cause to create 
humans is stated in the very beginning of Confessiones: ‘You have made us for yourself, O 
Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you’ (conf. I: 1.1)
60
. And in De Civitate Dei 
he further adduces God’s final intention for mankind ‘to enjoy God and each other in God’ 
(civ. Dei XIX: 17) (vide p. 46).  
 
(b) The false Peace of The City of Men and the true Peace of the City of God 
 
Peace, as Augustine shows, can be used in very wide terms. He proceeds with exemples of 
situations in which the word is imputed with more and more cynical overtones and bears less 
and less resemblance with the altruistic heavenly peace in the City of God. Sedition or a 
conspiracy is helpless where it lacks internal peace; but those are caricatures of peace, 
scarcely situations eligible for such an application.  
Thus he who prefers what is right to what is depraved and the well-ordered to the 
corrupted, he sees that the peace of the unjust is not to be called peace in comparison 
with the peace of the just.  
Itaque pacem iniquorum in pacis comparatione iustorum ille uidet nec pacem esse 
dicendam, qui nouit praeponere recta prauis et ordinata peruersis. (civ. Dei, XIX: 12) 
This peace is instigated by a motive, and so it is cynically teleological.   
 God has and is absolute peace as He is absolutely immutable in His essence (civ. Dei, 
VII: 30). Teleology then offers an opportunity to experience what can at least be called the 
happy life (civ. Dei, XIX: 20)
61
. If one’s faculty of volition conforms itself to proper ordering of 
the divine hierarchy of existential value, one approximates what is Being. True peace is the 
prerogative of the heavenly city, the City of God. It is because this city is the only one 
actively expressing the created nature of a civitas, a society; thus it is the essence of society. 
The City of God is not mentioned to have, like the cities of earth, an order of command and 
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 Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. (conf. I: 1.1) 
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 I owe this observation to Bonnie Kent as she deliberations on a related theme of Augustine’s notion of 




concordance in obeying; and it is still the most ordered and harmonious in comparison with 
them. 
Civil peace is an arranged concord of citizens on who obey and who command; the 
peace of heaven is flawless harmony and this perfectly ordered.  
Pax ciuitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia ciuium, pax caelestis 
ciuitatis ordinatissima et concordissima. (civ. Dei, XIX: 13) 
The peace of heaven is invested with superlatives in juxtaposition to the civil peace attained 
on earth, which is classified more like an ersatz peace; it is definitely to be used and to effect 
as much good as possible, but since its length of time is uncertain, likely to disappear and 
even be a source of malcontent as the ‘wrong sort of peace’ it cannot be enjoyed (frui) in a 
teleological sense. Detected at length by the malcontent as a false peace, it is its own cause of 
dissolution.  
Those vices in love which Terence recites, “insults, suspicions, hostility, intermittent 
war and peace”, do they not fill up human affairs everywhere? Do they not often occur 
in sincere friendships?And peace is indeed precarious, since we do not know the heart 
of those with whom we want to keep it. Even if we happened to know it today, we 
would do well in not making any claim to know what those hearts would be like the 
day after.   
Illa, quae in amore uitia commemorat idem Terentius, “iniuriae suspiciones, 
inimicitiae bellum, pax rursum”: nonne res humanas ubique impleuerunt? nonne et in 
amicorum honestis amoribus plerumque contingunt? … pacem uero incertum bonum, 
quoniam corda eorum, cum quibus eam tenere uolumus, ignoramus, et si hodie nosse 
possemus, qualia cras futura essent utique nesciremus. (civ. Dei, XIX: 5) 
The uncertainty contained in its experience is what renders a mortal life unsuitable for total 
ontic investment. Heaven is the only thing worthy of orientation in this life,  
where God will be everything in everyone in certain perpetuity and perfect peace. 
ubi erit Deus omnia in omnibus, aeternitate certa et pace perfecta. (civ. Dei, XIX: 20)  
This ‘perfect peace’ is the peace which Augustine wants the reader to seek and finally join; 
that is why we can say that our final good is peace. 





VANITY AND TRUTH  
(a) Towards Nothing 
 
Arraying peace with a diversity of contextual repercussions Augustine entices the 
philosophical disposed reader on to figure out how peace without imperfection and 
termination is a fitting telos, even though life’s vicissitudes, cited by Terence (vide above), 
are obstructing the attainment of true happiness along with humans habituated sinfulness. Still 
the reader is not discouraged in the pursuance of an ethical policy, sustaining mortality as a 
prelude to the Heavenly City, a cathartic approximation to God. Otherwise the whole text of 
De Civitate Dei would be obsolete for other purposes than reading and exercising Latin 
grammar and style; for 




Si autem desit aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? (civ. 
Dei, XI: 2)  
Augustine emphasizes the importance of this notion of via.  He describes Jesus Christ the 
Human as Way (via) (ibidem). What helps in following the Truth on the Way to Life, is to 
avoid the quagmires of falsity, to discontinue acts motivated by vanity, leading to teleological 
emptiness.           
 Emptiness, falsity and vanity are notions which are all contained in the Latin word 
vanitas. It is also very appositely translatable to untruth in antagonism between veritas. The 
noun occurs no less than 72 times in De Civitate Dei and often within citations from biblical 
passages
63
. It is a concept which very much constructs and leads the teleological outlook 
which the pagan aristocrat should progressively obtain during the process of reading, and 
hence its implementation in ethical discourse is worthy of inspection.    
 Since Augustine is convinced that existence has a goal and that the goal is the very 
eudemonia which he has sought for in vain before his conversion and since, moreover, that 
happiness is only attainable in God, pointlessness in eudaemonistic endeavours is indicated as 
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the hallmark of the plain lack, whether deliberately or by ignorance, of acknowledgement of 
the true God. It is a lack of recognition of telos and thus a hole in the teleological matrix 
which sustains a raison d'être.           
 In the contexts of De Civitae Dei I would define vanity in its ontic core as a 
disoriented attention, which is devoid of meaning and profit in the teleology wherein it is 
reckoned. As a more universal example: When someone spends too much ontic energy on 
physical appearance, on glory and on fame as ends in themselves, that someone is on the 
wrong track. These acts are vain precisely because they are ultimately in vain, given the 
mistaken orientation in which they are perpetrated. Teleologically according to Augustine, 
they would lead to nowhere.         
  Pursuing this rationale, vanus is the adjective which is ascribed by Augustine 
generically to pagan philosophical enterprises (civ. Dei, XIX: 1). Augustine reduces the pre-
Christian philosophical endeavours to ‘worthless things’ (rebus vanis) in comparison with the 
hope (nostra spes) which Christians have in anticipation of their telos, a hope that they have 
received and whose fulfilment will be given to them as ‘true beatitude’ (vera beatitude) 
(ibidem). Augustine’s fellow Christians, with whom he wants the aristocratic pagan to unify, 
have an explicit telos to which to look forward. That is their hope with which they can sustain 
a degree of the genuine happiness, albeit temporal.       
 The seemingly happiness of the wicked is nothing but vanity. Their telos is none-
existent. In fact a sinful life and a thorough disregard of God’s precepts are teleological 
reductions ad minimum. 
For whoever exists, is this, a keeper of God’s commandments; because the person who 
is not this is nothing, for he is not reformed to the image of Truth but remains in the 
likeness of vanity. 
Quicumque enim est, hoc est, custos utique mandatorum Dei; quoniam qui hoc non 
est, nihil est; non enim ad ueritatis imaginem reformatur, remanens in similitudine 
uanitatis. (civ. Dei, XX: 3) 
Here vanitas is signified as the emptiness from which one is created and veritas as the truth 
which is Existence, by whom one is created. The quote moreover raises the issue of human 
beings being created in God’s likeness. What does it mean to be an image of something or 
somebody? Gerald Bonner rightly claims in his discussion of Augustine’s doctrine of sacrifice 
that ‘the efficacity of any image depends on the relation to its original’ (Bonner, 1991, p. 
103). Hence only an upholder (custos) of divine justice reflects truthfully the original Divinity 
and fulfils its destiny as an image. The emptiness or vanity of an image occurs when it is 
61 
 
rendered dissimilar to what it reflects through a prism constituted of acts which avert from the 
nature of what it is supposed to reflect. It is a possibility which arises from Augustine’s idea 
on the cause of evil which is grounded on the dogma of creation ex nihilo. Every created thing 
has the potential for evil because it is created ‘out of nothing’ (ex nihilo). Angels and humans 
alike are made by God (ab illo) but not of God (de illo) but of nothing (de nihilo) (civ. Dei, 
XII: 1)
64
.           
 Accordingly human volition has the prerequisite to defect from what is ultimately 
Existence, id est God. In a consideration on human ontics and moral choices Augustine 
delegates all efficient causality to God and adds deficient causes into the discourse, which 
Woodfield’s example of the house fails to include (vide p. 14), in order to explain evil
65
: 
I know this: that the nature of God can never and nowhere be deficient, but that 
something, which is made from nothing, can. Still, they exist more thoroughly 
inasmuch they do good deeds, for then they actually do something and have an 
efficient cause. But insofar they defect [from God]; they sin and have deficient causes, 
for what are their acts but empty?
66
  
Hoc scio, naturam Dei numquam, nusquam, nulla ex parte posse deficere, et ea posse 
deficere, quae ex nihilo facta sunt. Quae tamen quanto magis sunt et bona faciunt 
(tunc enim aliquid faciunt), causas habent efficientes; in quantum autem deficiunt et 
ex hoc mala faciunt (quid enim tunc faciunt nisi uana?), causas habent deficientes. 
(civ. Dei, XII: 8) 
Since symptoms of evil have their cause in nothingness, that cause has no essence (essentialis 
nulla sit causa) (civ. Dei, XII: 9). Evil acts are indeed in vain and empty (vana) of any 
teleological point. Ergo, to oppose God is futile, if the motive is self-realization, and 
Augustine quotes a psalm of the Old Testament to corroborate this contention: ‘What his heart 
spoke made no sense’ (uana locutum est cor eius) (civ. Dei, XVII: 18). It made no sense by 
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 Quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, uerum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt. 
(civ. Dei, XII: 1) 
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 A. M. Fairweather argues that Augustine compared with Thomas Aquinas has a cosmic sense of evil 
influenced by his Manichean leanings and that he never seems to have freed himself from such leanings. The 
sequence of the 22 books attests to this. There is no surprise that by a person like Augustine, who searches for a 
meaning and a purpose with his own life and with the world, evil as a theme seems alluded to be an existent 
force; but his cosmological sense of evil never excludes in De Civitate Dei evil’s inferiority vis-à-vis good and 
its position as vanitas (emptiness). 
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 I think that translating both nusquam and nulla ex parte would be redundant, and that what can be considered 
as a pleonasm is merely an emphasis on the simplicity of God, I have put the translation of aliquid faciunt in 
italics to emphasize Augustine’s effort in his rhetoric to bring home the point. 
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the very fact that it was against God, which for Augustine is the focal point of all 
meaningfulness. Indeed Augustine has cited another verse of the Psalms (94: 11) not long 
earlier in the same book, notifying the reader that whatever thoughts (cogitationes) conceived, 
which are not from God (ab illo), are in vain (vanae) (civ. Dei, XVII: 4).    
 Manichaean supposed piety is based on vanity, because it is based upon an all too 
human perspectiv (civ. Dei, XIV: 5). Marcus Dods has translated Augustine’s commentary on 
the psychology behind their dogma about the evilness of the body and the goodness of the 
soul into the following: ‘These things derive from human fancy and not from divine truth’(id 
uanitate sentit humana, non ueritate diuina). I think fancy is quite an extended translation of 
vanitas, but it underscores the point that capriciousness is a hallmark of a dogma constructed 
on the basis of human experience. Manicheans are fallacious promulgators of truth, according 
to the ex-Manichean Augustine, and their vanity or futility is symptomatic of conflating 
condition (habitus) with nature (natura)
67
, so that with Augustine’s intellectual spectacles 
Manichean duality is not at all discussing true cosmology and teleology but simply proffers 
what human cognizance undergoes as a consequence of a compromised nature.    
 The reader must disentangle himself from any paradigm having its foundation on 
vanity. Presumptions that the gods will protect them are deceptive (quanta sit uanitate 
praesumptum) (civ. Dei, I: 3) for it is based on wishful thinking. The risk of not being 
attentive enough thereof is to waste one’s life on adiafora which will confiscate too much 
time. Life is full of undertakings and entertainments which are pointless, exactly because of 
the vain presumptions of pagan religion, especially when what is founded on fictive pretence 
become incursive in society, like a pointless and immoral sit-com.  The reader is told that the 
games he frequents are constituted on false stories (uanitati deputant fabularum…unde ludi 
fierent) (civ. Dei, XVIII: 12), and thus the description of that particular participation of the 
pagan aristocrat demonstrates that vanitas stands in contraposition to truth as a mistake of 
teleological prioritizing; so such events are not simply adiaphorous but outright detrimental to 
a determinate confrontation with truth. Therefore the error of teleological orientation is what 
produces wickedness and not the things to which one turns. These things are not necessarily 
evil but the prioritizing of them on behalf of what is closer to telos is what effects evil 
(efficitur mala) (civ. Dei, XII: 6).         
 Augustine issues a caveat to the reader, in the description of the body and mind of 
human beings as somethings which not purely are because of their mutability.  He compares 
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the mental components of a human being with a cup of water which has something which it is 
not: 
Hence [these things] can be deprived of what they have and turn into other conditions 
or qualities and change; so that a vase can be emptied of its liquid, a body can be 
discoloured, the air darken or grow cold, and the soul can lose its wisdom.
68
  
Hinc est quod etiam priuari possunt rebus, quas habent, et in alios habitus uel 
qualitates uerti atque mutari, ut et uas euacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus 
decoloretur et aer tenebrescat siue frigescat et anima desipiat. (civ. Dei, XI: 10)  
The implicit exhortation shows the pedagogic side of Augustine’s rhetoric. Most people have 
an aversion of growing foolish with the years (desipiat), and herby the reader’s emptiness is 
presumed in the fact that he still lives and has not yet met his efficient or final cause. The 
farther a thing is from the most indivisible Trinity the less reliable it is to persist in its 
intended being; the more a lie a thing is based on, the more unstable
69
 it becomes. Next to 
heavenly fulfilment this life is virtually nothing and a human is affected by this as he is living 
it (ista vita mortalis, ubi homo uanitati similis factus est) (civ. Dei, XXI: 24).  
  
(b) The Exigency of Truth 
 
While vanitas is to be avoided veritas is to be sought. Veritas stands in opposition to vanitas 
in the following manner: Veritas which means truth, the adjective verus (true) and verax 
(truthful) and the adverb veraciter (truly, truthfully) are contributing to counterpoint the 
derivatives of vanitas, and they comprise a theme which adumbrates how to prevent the 
detrimental tendency of vanitas in the human condition on earth. By knowing the genuine 
article contra a fallacious version of a concept, whether it be a sacrifice, a god, a cosmological 
theory or an ethical precept, there can be a conscious approach towards the only true society 
which fulfils with superlatives the definition of people and of state, the City of God, which is 
‘eternally truthful and truthful for all eternity’ (semper ueracem et ueraciter sempiterna) (civ. 
Dei, IX: 21).            
 It is also naturally a state of blessedness, given that the owner of the City is the Giver 
                                                          
 
68
 To translate desipiat to loose one’s wisdom is somewhat liberal. However, as Augustine is relating to things 
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 Vanus in the Aeneid, which the pagan aristocrat very likely has read, can mean untruthfull,  fickle, 
untrustworthy and unstable (Virgil, Aeneid, VI: 283). 
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of felicity (dator felicitatis) (civ. Dei, IV: 25). That is why Augustine imputes eudaemonistic 
self-contradictoriness to the notion of metempsychosis in the eudemonistic theory of the 
Platonists, and gives credit to Porphyry for abjuring this opinion and to Christianity for 
possibly, and in any event surreptitiously, influencing him for that abjuration (civ. Dei, XII: 
20)
70
. This life is ‘where truth is held in hatred’ (ubi odio ueritas habeatur) (ibidem) and 
metempsychosis would perpetuate an interposition of falseness which would in turn make 
existence very dystopic in Augustine’s eyes. The finality of telos in Augustinian thinking is 
absolute, and it is argued that this is imperative for the obtainment of true blessedness. If true 
beatitude is to be achieved, no possibility of relapse can be existent.  
How can they claim that the more a man loves God, the more readily he reaches 
beatitude, when they also teach something which makes love itself become dull? For 
who would feel love more negligent and tepid for someone whom he thinks he must 
abandon by necessity, and from whose truth and wisdom he will [eventually] avert? 
And this will happen when he has arrived at the most complete awareness of perfect 
happiness of which he is capable. When can one love [even] a human friend with 
fidelity, of whom one knows one will become an enemy?  
Quo modo ergo fatentur, quanto plus quisque amauerit Deum, tanto eum facilius ad 
beatitudinem peruenturum, qui ea docent, quibus amor ipse torpescat? Nam quis non 
remissius et tepidius amet eum, quem se cogitat necessario deserturum et contra eius 
ueritatem sapientiamque sensurum, et hoc cum ad eius plenam pro sua capacitate 
notitiam beatitudinis perfectione peruenerit? quando nec hominem amicum possit 
quisque amare fideliter, cui se futurum nouit inimicum. (civ. Dei, XII: 20) 
Tepid, lukewarm love will not do for Augustine, probably referring to Revelation (3.16). 
Cicero is stripped of authority as a philosopher by the simple fact of being an Academic 
Sceptic and not taking a solid and clear philosophical standpoint (civ. Dei, IV: 30). A lover of 
God, a lover of Wisdom, id est a philosopher cannot be sceptical about what he loves and in 
the process of loving. De civitae Dei requests an absolute choice to love.   
 Augustine views himself, as is apparent from his didactics, that he is promulgating the 
truth of wisdom to the pagan reader, not a hypothesis on the order of things. A claim to 
undisputable truth, however, necessitates a higher degree of rapport between a reader and an 
author.   
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It is a great matter which is at stake, when true and holy divinity, which affords to us 
the support needed for the fragility of the life we now live, is being preached to be 
sought and worshipped on account of the blessed life which is eternal and not on 
account of this mortality, which is like transitory vapour.
71
   
Multum magna res agitur, cum uera et uere sancta diuinitas, quamuis ab ea nobis 
etiam huic, quam nunc gerimus, fragilitati necessaria subsidia praebeantur, non 
tamen propter mortalis uitae transitorium uaporem, sed propter uitam beatam, quae 
non nisi aeterna est, quaerenda et colenda praedicatur (civ. Dei, VII: praefatio).  
To preach truth is a grave matter because of what is at stake; which is both the magnitude and 
longevity of the consequences of evangelical misinterpretation. Accordingly, the work of De 
Ciuitate Dei have queries whose solutions require the help from God, lord of truth (Domino 
Deo ueritatis adiuuante) (civ. Dei, XIII, 24), since Augustine himself is a finite being. 
 In the aftermath of having read De Civitate Dei the stake are still there in every day 
experiences, God is needed as a helper and sacrifices must be made by the former pagan. ‘A 
true sacrifice’ is to devote oneself to truth.  
A true sacrifice is the total enterprise (in life) which leads us to union with God in the 
Holy Society. In fact it relates to the final cause of good by which we can be truly 
happy. 
Verum sacrificium est omne opus, quo agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo, 
relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni, quo ueraciter beati esse possimus. (civ. Dei, X: 6) 
Thus enjoining oneself to the City of God by a sincere effort is a true sacrifice to which every 
soul is invoked
72
.          
 The sacrifice of time spent reading De Civitate Dei is futile and false, if it is enticed by 
an interest to undermine whatever claims to truth one might find therein. At the first clash 
with De Civitate Dei as a philosophical treatise, argumentativeness could have reduced the 
pagan aristocratic to pettiness so that he would be anxious to defend his established paradigm. 
Confronting truth requires a focus which eschews the vain motive of debative victories. 
As Cicero says, logomachy distorts petty Greeks as they are more concerned with 
controversy than truth. 
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 This is in stark contrast to how Augustine describes the honours made to the Roman gods. In those cases a 
sacrifice is done in that of falseness (civ. Dei, XVIII: 12). 
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Ut ait Tullius [de. orat. I: 11.47], uerbi controuersia iam diu torqueat homines 
Graeculos contentionis cupidiores quam ueritatis (civ. Dei, IX: 5)  
Discussions and argumentations have a final cause and are not ends in themselves; as a means 
to an end they exist to facilitate the discovery of truth; hence in an extended sense Augustine 
exhorts the reader to enjoin one’s motive as seeking truth, all the while eschewing vanity, 
vanity as a consequence of a narrow self-interest confined within a distorted teleology. 
  
(c)  Right and wrong Orientation 
 
By being obsessed with objects with no or little intrinsic teleological value, the will 
deteriorates into vanity. 
Because when the will turns from superior things to inferior, evil ensues, not because 
it is evil that to which one turns, but since disorientation itself is a perversity. That is 
why the inferior thing does not make the will bad, but one has depravedly and 
inordinately coveted the inferior thing, since it is created. 
Cum enim se uoluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora conuertit, efficitur mala, non quia 
malum est, quo se conuertit, sed quia peruersa est ipsa conuersio. Idcirco non res 
inferior uoluntatem malam fecit, sed rem inferiorem praue atque inordinate, ipsa quia 
facta est, adpetiuit. (civ. Dei, XII: 6) 
While veritas represent what actually is, vanitas represents a mirage thereof and in actuality 
represents pointless nothingness. That is why Augustine sees vanity (vanitas) as the evil act of 
turning to inferior things further from God, and hence the concept is a regular deterrent in the 
teleology of De Civitate Dei. Every evil has only an extrinsic value, inasmuch it is allowed for 
the greater good of free will, and has no intrinsic value in the evaluation of ontic worth, for 
absolute evil is non-being (civ. Dei, XI: 9).        
 Good men can indeed use the wicked by this ordinance (utantur malis boni) (civ. Dei, 
XVI: 2). I have yet to come across an Augustinian passage that indicates bad men’s use of the 
good in the sense using (uti) is propagated as a purposeful act in teleological asymptocity. 
Even though Augustine explicitly admits that injustice ‘exploits good persons as well as evil 
ones’ (civ. Dei, XIII: 5)
73
, this is always a misuse, and because the purposes of the wicked are 
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misplaced too, id est that evil people use good people for their own twisted purposes, they do 
not use anything or anyone in a proper sense, for, (as mentioned in the previous chapter (p. 
46), ‘whoever uses something badly does not use it’ (div. qu. XXX).    
 God is not liable to this, He who is the Ultimate Good and makes use of good and bad 
alike on a cosmic scale.  
Those whom [God] foreknows will be condemned are made not in vain [but] are made 
for the use of those to be saved and for the comparison of the two Cities by mutual 




Quos liberandos non esse praesciuit, ad utilitatem liberandorum et comparationem 
duarum inter se a contrario ciuitatum non utique uane in totius rationalis creaturae 
pulcherrima atque iustissima ordinatione constituit. (civ. Dei, XVII: 11) 
Even though everything which is created from nothing has a proclivity towards vanitas, the 
designed act of creation itself is never done in vain (vane), and this applies for seemingly failures 
as well; otherwise God would have been liable to error.      
 Evil is emptiness and does not have its source in God, since God is in no way deficient 
(nulla ex parte posse deficere), and one must therefore look to one’s own will to fathom the 
source of defection. Contrasting cities comprise a convenient polarization of ontic wills with 
God as the standard of measurement. The deliberate avoidance of vanitas is a voluntary 
choice, a conduit to the City of God and a safeguarding of one’s telos.   
Two kinds of love form two cities, the Earthly City by the love of itself so far as 
contempt for God, and the Heavenly City by the love of God so far as contempt for 
itself. 
Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad 
contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. (civ. Dei, XIV: 
28) 
The choice hereof is matter of which type of love by which one is moved, and the wrong 
choice is hard to discern from the right one, since truth is what the opposite scheme of vanity 
is; and so vanity deceives the vain person himself. 
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synchrony with the communicated meaning. Quos liberandos non esse praescivit is a litotic clause, which 




In these two men, so in in two families, likewise in two peoples and accordingly in 
two realms there comes a rule of justice by which, when vigilantly applied and if we 
rightly order our motive, we will easily see where happiness [dwells] or the fallacious 
appearance thereof.   
In his duobus hominibus, ita in duabus familiis, ita in duobus populis, ita in duobus 
regnis regula sequitur aequitatis, qua uigilanter adhibita si nostra intentio corrigatur, 
facillime uidebimus ubi habitet uanitas et ubi felicitas. (civ. Dei, IV: 3) 
Vanitas is not articulated as the diametrical opposite of felicitas but as manifesting a pseudo 
felicity; and what vanity ultimately generates is misery because of its deceptive nature. Vanity 
propagates division and with the division there arrives a false sense of independence from 
God and thence pride, just as Augustine describes vanity overwhelming the spirits of the 
fallen angels:  
As they were imbued with the cunning of vanity instead of the certainty of truth, an 
interest for particular objects instead of love of unity, they became proud, deceitful 
and envious. 
Vanitatis astutiam pro certissima ueritate, studia partium pro indiuidua caritate 
superbi fallaces inuidi effecti sunt. (civ. Dei, XII: 1) 
Then the opposite position must be taken by the pagan reader fo the sake of joining the peace 
of the City of God, which analogically implies to unite oneself with other human beings in a 












Conclusion: the Potentialities of Appeal. 
            
(a) Felicity, which the Reader seeks 
 
Eudemonia is the philosophical term of happiness, not just any happiness affirmed 
colloquially but a considerably more sublime gratification and lasting spiritual delight.  
Methods to achieve this blessed state have been reasoned out and delivered through diverse 
philosophical schools and are additionally depended on what eudemonia implies for each 
particular philosophical tradition. It is not unlikely that the debutant reader of De Civitate Dei 
expects that a potentiality of eudaemonistic achievements resides in Augustine’s ethics. 





That every human wants to be happy is the certain opinion of everybody who can in 
some way use their brains.  
 
Omnium certa sententia est, qui ratione quoquo modo uti possunt, beatos esse omnes 
homines uelle. (civ. Dei, X: 1) 
 
The notion and actual existence of a telos render the acts of the candidate for 
eudemonia purposive and cohesive and should therefore be adhesive to a single moral point of 
view whereon morality would be meant as a modulator of the candidate’s orientation, id est 
his thoughts and will. In this manner, telos or finis boni has all to do with voluntas. A rational 
person can absorb intellectually the teleological sentiments of De Civitate Dei, but whether to 
agree or disagree with it, believe or disbelieve it, is as a matter of volition (vide p. 29). 
Augustine delivers a very simple but useful anecdote, wherein are portrayed two men 
catching a glimpse of a beautiful woman whereat one of them starts to desire an illicit 
enjoyment (inlicite fruendum) with the woman’s body and the other preserves in his 
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(spiritual) composure with a modest will, or a will more sensitive to shame (voluntate pudica) 
and so in effect a more conscientious will.    
If two [persons] who see a beautiful body are likewise affected in body and mind
76
, 
and one of them is moved to illicit enjoyment of that body and the other firmly 
preservers  with a chaste will, what cause are we to believe there is for the bad will in 
the one and not the other? What phenomenon has made this will
77
? Certainly not the 
beauty of the body because, it occurred to both of them yet induced the bad will in 
only one. Was it the flesh of the onlooker? Why not in the other? Or was it in fact the 
mind of the onlooker? But why not both minds? 
Si enim aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo et corpore uideant unius corporis 
pulchritudinem, qua uisa unus eorum ad inlicite fruendum moueatur, alter in 
uoluntate pudica stabilis perseueret, quid putamus esse causae, ut in illo fiat, in illo 
non fiat uoluntas mala? Quae illam res fecit in quo facta est? Neque enim pulchritudo 
illa corporis; nam eam non fecit in ambobus, quando quidem amborum non 
dispariliter occurrit aspectibus. An caro intuentis in causa est? cur non et illius? An 
uero animus? cur non utriusque? (civ. Dei, XII: 6) 
The moot question is what the efficient cause is for each reaction developing and surfacing in 
the two persons in question
78
. Augustine’s idea proclaiming the body’s rebellious position 
exonerates the guilt of involuntary concupiscence (civ. Dei, I: 25), not only physically but 
also mentally, exactly because sometimes it verily is ‘the thought that counts’. The example 
of the beautiful woman displays a leniency towards the almost involuntary commutations in 
the psychic in the same mode as a Stoic would defend a sage’s momentary perturbation in the 
confrontation with a huge wave far out on a tempestuous sea. John Sellar paraphrases from 
the fifth book of Epictetus Discourses: 
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 Here it is to be observed that when the two persons are ‘equally affected in body and soul’ (et animo et 
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thereby not a noetic explanation on why any lust occurs in the one and not in the other;. Volition is presented 








 The categorical conclusion is that there is none, not an efficient cause at any rate (vide p. 61). Evil acts are by-
products of an evil will, a deficiency which is hard to grasp because it is ungraspable.  
Where there are deficiencies [the mind] recognizes them by not knowing them; for who can grasp 
deficiencies?  




It [Epictetus’ book] argued that the impressions we receive that present external 
objects to us are not within our control…However we do have the power to choose 
whether to assent to these impressions. (Sellars, 2006, p. 66)  
However, Augustine proves to be much less strict than the Stoics on the issue of 
human passions, interpreted by them as perturbations. Passions can be used, if the volition is 
already oriented towards God and therefore comports itself to His order of justice: 
[The Bible] subjects the mind itself to God to be ruled and aided. Passions are likewise 
subjected to the mind to be moderated and restrained, so that they can be turned for 
purposes of justice. Thereupon our discipline [of ethics] does not so much inquire 
whether a pious mind is furious, but why it is furious; and not so much whether the 
mind is sad, but what is causing the sadness.  
 
Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuuandam mentique passiones ita 
moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usum iustitiae conuertantur. Denique in disciplina 
nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum 
sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis. (civ. Dei, IX: 5)  
 
Augustine’s purports early in De Civitate Dei that suffering and troubles are not inglorious 
but that the handling of them can most certainly be (civ. Dei, I: 8). Passion apposite to telos is 
benevolent, as earthly peace is benevolent where the ideal of heavenly peace lingers in the 
collective memory (vide p. 21). Indolence, as in lack of appropriate passion, is in fact 
detrimental to a teleological disposed volition, especially since the power of demons is 
constantly at work. Therefore one needs to stick to the teachings of Jesus Christ, the mediator, 
the more tenaciously (tanto tenacious Mediatori) (civ. Dei, XVIII: 18).    
 So the universal longing for felicity anticipates a reading with hope for eudaemonistic 
emolument, not only by the informative aspect but also by the emotional aspects of making 
sense of the text. An amoral, apathetic approach to Augustinian ethics bears little fruit in any 
case, and the person who reads with such an outlook does not have the Holy Spirit working 
within him (vide p. 76). If, however, the premise of God’s delightfulness is acknowledged, 
and if this delightfulness is incorporated into one’s spiritual paradigm as telos, a genuine 
interest in the ethical sentiments of Augustine is quite plausible, when moral conduct and 
demeanour are presented as conducive to the eventual enjoyment of that existential fulfilment. 
Unfortunately enough, the inspiration to persist in a moral behaviour and in a devotion to 
Augustine’s God is disturbed by the onerousness and perturbations in this life, which are at 
variance with the happiness purportedly secured by the ethical prescription. Delusion may 
ensue and perhaps even a dismissal of any analogical relationship between Augustine’s 
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teleology and his ethical exhortations and sentiments.       
 Augustine is very aware of this potential resentment of the pagan aristocrat and the 
reader is told very early on in De Civitate Dei that God doles out happiness and misery to 
good and bad people alike (civ. Dei, I: 8); and subsequently the divine reasons appertaining to 
this indiscriminate dispensation are divulged (civ. Dei, I: 9). Augustine allots a teleological 
inevitability to the lives of wicked personalities which only respects their volitions as 
meaningful for the ‘exercise of patience (exercitio patientiae) and advancement of wisdom 
(provectum sapientiae) for good people (vide p. 66). Thus the good use evil for their benefit 
as exercises of their ontic capacity
79
. Being a subject under a tyrannical political power ‘is not 
punishment of crime, but a test on virtue (non est poena criminis, sed uirtutis examen) (civ. 
Dei, IV: 3). At the end of De Civitate Dei Augustine confirms that true (vera) and secure 
(secura) happiness is reserved only for the good at the final judgement and so the felicity of 
the wicked is merely contentment (civ. Dei, XXII: 30). That contentment fits the attributes of 
being fortunate the state of which Cicero in his De Finibus describes as the following: 
‘Nothing had happened to him which he did not want to happen’ (nihil acciderat ei, quod 
nollet) (Cicero, fin. V: 92). That is a description which is contingent upon a purely good will 
for it to operate as true bliss, and Augustine’s rhetoric denies this for most humans. Upon 
whom humans are contingent is God, who is the ‘drinkable fountain of felicity’ (fons 
bibendae felicitates) and who affords perpetual joy ‘if we only stick to Him’ (Illi cohaerendo 
beati simus) (civ. Dei, VIII: 10).        
 His eudaemonistic phrases are hereby pithy and cogent, alone imbued with inspiratory 
attributes, but the disquisition of a whole teleological outlook throughout De Civitae Dei 
requires patience on the part of the reader to which Augustine’s predestinarian sentiments can 
be discouraging.    
(b) Predestination as Appeal in the Subtext of De Civitate Dei  
 
In general parlance, Augustine is considered a precursor to the development of the theology 
of predestination as described in the introduction (vide p. 7, footnote 4). Traditionally, the 
Pelagian controversy
80
 is said to mark Augustine's formulation of a predestinarian point of 
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 Sed malus frater in filio suo, hoc est, in opere suo, puer, id est servus est fratrum bonorum, cum ad 
exercitationem patientiae vel ad provectum sapientiae scienter utantur malis boni. (civ. Dei, XVI: 2) 
 
80
 The Pelagian controversy came about when a monk from Britain, Pelagius, taught that free will makes it 
possible for humans to be perfect in this life on earth. It ‘was the possible life, because it was the necessary life’ 
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view, emphasizing the centrality in the Fall of Man and the consequent restrictions on human 
free will, namely in the ability to choose good by one’s own. During this controversy he 
ascribes to God such a dominate part in His dispensing of grace, that it is hard to understand 
how ethics, propounded in De Civitae Dei for the pagan reader, can have any other point than 
exhibit the author’s insights of a truth which cannot be altered and whose comprehension will 
not affect any providential outcome.Augustine has ascribed to God an eternal and 
unchangeable intention (inmutabile aeternumque consilium) with everything He creates (civ. 
Dei, XII: 14) (also vide p. 67), and in the prologue of De Civitae Dei he calls God ‘my helper’ 
(Deus adiutor noster est)
81
, and hence De Civitate Dei is per se a component in God’s 
providence. If the reader has gotten wind of Augustine’s theory on predestination and feel it 
in the subtext of the bifurcation of the two Cities, (the Earthly and the Heavenly), it can 
possibly feel a bit condescending of a god, who inspired the author in the first place and aided 
him in the process of outlining a vision of morality which neither is destined to receive the 
consent of the reader nor will perforce have any soteriological value.   
 As we have seen, perpetual life is the end of goodness, and the end of evil is perpetual 
death, a bifurcation which normally leaves little ambiguity as to which part is preferable. 
What Augustine must have at the ready is a clear phraseology on which his ethical 
counselling is to rely, so that one can know on which path and to where one is headed (civ. 
Dei, XIX: 4). Augustine believes of all the philosophical schools or trends  
that though there is a manifold discordance of opinions, even so, there is no one who 




multiplex discrepantia sit opinionum, esse tamen aliquam naturae causam, scientiae 
formam, uitae summam nemo cunctatur. (civ. Dei, XI: 25) 
Science is not attributed here with an efficient nor with a final cause but its method (or form) 
must be implemented in a causality of some kind. Although it is far from the kerygmatic 
centre of devotion, scientific ethics is not contemplated as something outside the purview of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Wilbur, 2010, p. 202). This line of thought threatened Augustine’s view on grace and on the significance of 
Christ sacrifice for humanity. 
 
81
 The plural of noster is purely ethical and does not imply that Augustine had any collaborator.  
 
82 
Causa could technically also be translated as final cause, but in the propinquity of summam linked to vita, I 
conjecture that Augustine would have used summam there as well, id est in reference to natura, if a final cause 
was what he wanted to indicate.  
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religiosity, for God is also ‘God of knowledge’ (qui est Deus scientiarum) (civ. Dei, XVII: 4).
 In his autobiography Augustine is ostensibly a man whose life is goal-oriented, which 
implicates a telos, always present and giving inspiration, strength and guidance to an ontic 
progress. The telos is what has marked some of his actions and moral choices as wrong and 
some as right, and this disposition of the author, extrapolated into the text of De Civitate Dei, 
has made all the morality displayed therein some kind of ethical consequentialism. De 
Civitate Dei is mostly an informative work and not a didactic one, I would postulate. The 
reader is never so much commanded to follow specific ethical precept than being explicated 
diverse consequences (vide p. 40) ensuing certain perpetrations and neglects. Odontology is 
implicit in the omnipotence of God and the Commandments of the Old testament, but what is 
actually disserted as the teleological message in De Civitate Dei is subordinated to the 
question: What is the consequence of this action, feeling, thought, attitude and neglect, 
committed by me, vis-à-vis my relation with God?       
 To give a serious answer thereon one must comprehend Augustine’s views on virtue 
and the concomitant fusion of the will of God and that of a virtuous human.  
 Ethics is exigently the focal point for a candidate for existential consummation, and 
the candidacy subsists as long as telos is not yet achieved; for ἦθος, which means habit 
(Liddell, 1978, p. 226), defines a person and hence his capacity to ontologically transform 
towards its own completion which in turn, within the ambit of Augustine’s theology, would 
portend his capacity to participate in God who is the giver of felicity (dator felicitatis) (civ. 
Dei, IV: 25) (vide p. 64). It is an exigency which normative ethics fails to satisfy by itself, 
since Augustine disbelieves any perfection of one’s soul is attainable in this life (civ. Dei, V: 
19). Within reach are the ideals acknowledged by religious devotion and the choice to 
approximate them and with what degree of effort. 
Such men can have their virtues in this life inasmuch they attribute them to God’s 
glory, as He has given the virtues to those believers who seek them and at the same 
time comprehend how far there remains to attain that perfect righteousness extant in 
the society of angels and saints, for which they most laboriously
83
 prepare.  
Tales autem homines uirtutes suas, quantascumque in hac uita possunt habere, non 
tribuunt nisi gratiae Dei, quod eas uolentibus credentibus petentibus dederit, simulque 
intellegunt, quantum sibi desit ad perfectionem iustitiae, qualis est in illorum 
sanctorum angelorum societate, cui se nituntur aptare. (ibidem) 
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 God has already given the aristocratic pagan the virtue to read, grasp and consent to 
the substance of this magnum opus, De Civitae Dei, which is about a predestined future but 
does not emphasize predestination of individuals incapable of ‘choosing’ a side in the 
cosmology and historical outline propounded throughout the 22 books. One can then of 
course only make conjectures - for the supposed reader is only a straw man - that the good 
promises of Augustine’s teleology outweigh the menaces if one already has taken the steps to 
read and therefore be interested and devoted to the Bishop of Hippo’s religion, so that the 
prospect of happiness everlasting does not seem far-fetched. The reader’s volition and his 
privately adopted teleological ethics have then converged with that of God; and this has 
occurred with the help of God and the pagan aristocrat’s obedience. 
But the commended obedience, which lies in the precept, is a virtue and in a certain 
way the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the rational creation; is thus arranged 
that for the virtue it is advantageous to be under submission, and pernicious to follow 
its own will rather than that of the one who created it.  
Sed oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali mater 
quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei 
subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere 
uoluntatem. (civ. Dei, XIV: 12) 
If the consequence of following one’s own definition of virtue will stand contra to God’s 
purpose, even if the thought is benevolent, it is a fault. Augustine delimits virtue to the 
obedience and conformity to the teleological order which God has provided
84
. Prudence, 
justice, temperance and fortitude are the merely the symptoms of having consigned one’s soul 
to God. Obedience and to have it set under (subdita) God is advantageous (utile) for a created 
being, since it will consequently lead to telos. Unless the acknowledgement that virtues are 
ultimately derived from God, an attitude which is indicated by religious piety, Augustine 
warns that the same virtues will devolve into vices (civ. Dei XIX: 25).      
 In fact virtues apparently perfect by themselves are not strong enough to perfect the 
soul but wage a ‘constant war with our vices (quid hic agit nisi perpetua bella cum uitiis) (civ. 
Dei, XIX: 4). Virtues are purposive only insofar as they do lead to telos, the tête-à-tête vision 
of God, by their cathartic assets and ontic edification of the soul. Virtue is basically an 
advantageous willingness to cooperate with God, and Augustine furthermore explains how 
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 Virtue is the appellation of the act to use what ought to be used and enjoy what ought to be enjoyed (quae 
virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti) (div. qu. XXX). This clear-cut aphorism from De diversis 
Quaestionibus octoginta tribus is absent in De Civitate Dei, but substituted by a phraseology therein which 




weakness, which is imputed even to the future citizens of the City of God, is depended on 
forgiveness from God and mutual forgiveness of each other
85
.   
In this way the citizens of the city [of God] is taken care of, pilgrims as they are on 
this Earth, longing for the peace of the Father above. And the Holy Spirit operates 
within so that the medicine [of forgiveness], which is applied from without, can have 
any healing effect. 
Hoc modo curantur ciues ciuitatis Dei in hac terra peregrinantes et paci supernae 
patriae suspirantes. Spiritus autem sanctus operatur intrinsecus, ut ualeat aliquid 
medicina, quae adhibetur extrinsecus. (civ. Dei, XV: 6)     
Noticeably Augustine uses demittere alluding to the Jesus’ prayer instead of 
ignoscere
86
, reminding the reader (or telling him for the first time) that to be forgiven is to be 
released from a debt, perchance of having been able to take a stride towards teleological 
fulfilment by the very role of being the reader of De Civitate Dei. If there is no final purpose 
to absorb teleological ethics other than to realize how off the mark one is and might always 
be, then what is the point of being a reader of sound teleological sentiments on truth and 
peace? Moral accountability yields little inducement to act rightly, if one’s will is already 
supposed to be preordained to divine will’s conformity; but demttere debita makes possible to 
account for one’s actual shortcomings in relation to telos, and the extrinsic and intrinsic 
workings of the Holy Spirit as divine aid is anyhow going to lessen the amount of debt which 
must be forgiven. The language evokes an impression of a telos much in activity (vide p. 18), 
as an instigator of humans’ fulfilment in and by it. Augustine’s God is a pragmatic god, both 
curator and cure; 
and when [God] does not guide the mind and act upon it with inward grace then 
publication of truth is of no benefit. But God does this; that He distinguishes between 
instruments of mercy and of wrath.  
nec interiore gratia mentem regat atque agat, nihil prodest homini omnis praedicatio 
ueritatis. Facit autem hoc Deus a uasis misericordiae irae uasa discernens, 
dispensatione qua ipse nouit multum occulta, sed tamen iusta. (civ. Dei, XV: 6) 
Hence it is clear that ultimately the reader, in the acquisition and acceptance of the Christian 
message as it is promulgated by Augustine in De Civitate Dei, is dependent on grace, the 
dispensing of which is secret (occulta) but just (iusta).     
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 Ignoscere evokes rather the notion of overlooking (Simpson, 1977, p. 285). 
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 That does not, however, mean that the messages therefrom are unproductive. Someone 
might argue that Augustine’s theories on predestination effaces any relevance to whether one 
agrees with or disparage the overall message in De Civitate Dei. I would allow a more 
optimistic solution which is still not discrepant from the very real predestinarian persuasion of 
Augustine by the time he finishes this magnum opus.       
 In an explicit formulation De Civitate Dei omits potential deductions wherewith the 
practical value of uplifting insights and advices becomes obsolescent by the inevitability of 
the readers’ subsequent actions, for the direction of morals can go two ways: 
   
Nathan the prophet was sent for and accused King David of a grave sin and predicted 
that, for David, an evil future would follow. Who may contend that this does not 
pertain to society on earth, and similarly to that which is is either proclaimed publicly, 
id est for the safety and advantage of the people, or privately, when divine utterances, 
where something of the future is let known as a help in mortality, are acquired for the 
gain of one’s people and property? 
 
Missus est Nathan propheta, qui regem Dauid argueret de peccato graui et ei, quae 
consecuta sunt mala, futura praediceret.  Haec atque huius modi siue publice, id est 
pro salute uel utilitate populi, siue priuatim, cum pro suis quisque rebus diuina 
promereretur eloquia, quibus pro usu temporalis uitae futuri aliquid nosceretur, ad 
terrenam ciuitatem pertinuisse quis ambigat? (civ. Dei, XVII: 3) 
 
The advantage of the people (utilitas populi) purports teleological aid. Paratexually the 
prediction of Nathan can be well interpreted to allude to the text of De Civitate Dei, whose 
teleological and eschatological statements too will have an advantageous impact on the reader 
and his salvation – analogically utilitas legentis. It is not the perfunctorily reading of the 
whole oeuvre which is a sign of being elected but the proper acquisition of the content 
therein. Concurring with grace, reading De Civitate Dei for the right reasons is more a 
symptom of than an aid to good will. The consensus to use one's power from motivation 
based on veracious teleology (vide chapter five) is in itself a revelation of truth, a most useful 
epiphany for the reader's soteriological asymptocity, which the concomitant subtextual 
exhortation to truth (vide chapter six) can only commend, stabilize and encourage further. 
 
(c) The Assimilation of the pagan Episteme into Augustine’s Teleology 
 
Chapter five introduced the notion of uti and frui in order to establish the monitoring concept 
which Augustine offers as a judge of purposively sound behaviour and disposition. The stress 
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and interrelated distinction of uti and frui adumbrates that there is a eudaemonistic incentive 
to act piously because of its conduciveness to God. The ordering of one’s action, while 
bearing this conduciveness in mind for oneself and others, will mark out the difference 
between these two modes of experiencing and change an act. Exempli gratia, the reader is 
induced to order his household with God as telos as motivation, and so only by making 
imperāre tantamount to consūlere on each plateau of power-relationships will the pagan or 
Christian aristocrat obtain the operative modus of the approximation to telos in mortality. The 
sixth chapter has endeavoured to give an exposition on Augustine’s definitive and summary 
teleological sentiment by dealing with the concepts of peace (pax), vanity (vanitas) and truth 
(veritas) as key terms in a eudaemonistic matrix whereby an approval of the teleology of De 
Civitate Dei would subsist. Augustine’s text of De Civitate Dei seems to come out as having 
anticipated a ‘fusion of horizons’, as Gadamer would put it (Gadamer, 2012, p. 390). The 
fusion is that of Augustine’s Christian eschatological and teleological outlook and that of the 
centuries’ old paganism of the reader. It is a fusing of epistemai, and Augustine executes it 
quite subtly and sporadically.         
 His mission in De Civitate Dei seems foremost to criticize paganism and the 
shortcoming of pagan philosophy and to juxtapose the origin, development and final end of 
the City of Men and City of God, as has been mentioned in the introduction of the thesis. A 
teleological phraseology has been implanted with a consideration for paganistic nostalgia, 
including in the discourse poets like Vergil and Horace, historians like Sallust, philosophers 
like Cicero, Seneca, and Varro and even of a comedy writer like Terence. For his pagan 
contemporary this is a pivotal acquaintance and the starting platform on which De Civitate 
Dei has the potentiality to become a total confrontation with his pagan past, and whence an 
exhaustive introduction of a new worldview can be established. The pagan perspective has 
been confounded by means of its own material. Augustine’s particular employment of words 
like uti, potestas, consūlere, civitas, vanitas, vanus, veritas, verus, finis and pax obviously 
helps in stabilizing both a consistent and purposive orientation, but what is more, it triggers 
the idea that one’s accepted paradigm, as it is contained in established literature and to which 
the pagan reader has been devoted in his upbringing, can be preserved in its repertoire of 
notions and only permuted in the strict selection thereof, whereby the Christian teleology is 
the absolute assessor of the importance and implications of each notion.   
 Lecturing others on how to behave is a precarious business. Thus the regular 
occurrence of the same conception, whether in the form of appositional adjectives or verbs, 
might function as an aid in sustaining the attention of the reader and as an appeal to rationality 
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by cohesiveness. Bonface Ramsey appropriately states that ‘Augustine uses history as his 
vehicle, for it is easier to grasp by inquirers than a more strictly dogmatic approach’ (Ramsey, 
“De Catechizandis rudibus” in Augustine through the Ages, 2009, p.144). A purely dogmatic 
approach without any teleological justification would possibly be repugnant let alone 
unattractive to reader who devotes so much time on a single literary work. Reading a text as a 
text, id est as many individual thoughts interwoven, whence the Latin participle textus which 
means has been woven, is an experience and not just an optical act. Presuppositions can be 
either affirmed or confused when the reader not only reads De Civitate Dei but experiences 
the text as merging with and perhaps even changing his own ethical and teleological outlook. 
Experience is contingent upon one’s epistemology both of one’s surroundings and of 
available ideas. Hence, if one agrees with Jason BeDuhn that ‘consciousness itself, and the 
reasoning process with which it assesses its environment and itself, is changed by 
conversion,’ (BeDuhn, 2010, p. 6) it follows that, when the conversion is simultaneous with 
the reading process, the epistemology of the reader must be permuted if Augustine’s 
convictive goals are to be accomplished, both by and during the reading-experience. There is 
an environment of ideas of which the composition is formed by the explicit succession of 
sentiments in the reading of any text; and logically the longer the text the greater this 
environment gets. Each subject in De Civitate Dei is then likely to have an illocutionary 
correlation to the other in which each enhances the reader’s understanding and hopefully 
perhaps interest to the whole Christian philosophy offered therein.    
 Every different intertextual relation to each classical author is alone a thesis. This 
study has demonstrated in chapter four that Augustine wants his reader to approximate a 
better understanding of the true God by elements of his own epistemology, albeit nothing 
therein tells the aristocratic convert anything about God as telos. That information is for 
Augustine to supply, either with original articulations or with biblical citations. It is the the 
teleological agenda and tone of De Civitate Dei which monitors the conscientious 
contextualization of diverse references to and citations of pagan writers, id est the selective 
localization of them in the text.       
 Finally, this tone amounts to an allowance to emulate the intertextual example set by 
De Civitate Dei. Pagan classical texts are used (uti) by Augustine in his philosophy; and he 
deduces that the final cause of philosophy (causa philosophandi) is to become happy, and so 
converges it with the Final Good. 
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There is in fact no other purpose to philosophizing than to become happy, and what 
makes one happy is the final good. Nothing else, then, is the end of philosophizing 
than the Final Good.
 
 
Quando quidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem 
beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni. 
(civ. Dei, XIX: 1) 
Allowing the reader to pursue philosophy and make whatever truth thereof as he is able to, 
Augustine simultaneously demarks what good and veracious philosophy is: It is the pursuance 
of God. De Civitate Dei is a voluminous work on Christian philosophy and in the conveyance 
of this philosophy pagan arguments which, however decontextualized, have an iota of truth, 
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